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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, federalism would seem to have fared poorly under
the Obama administration. The administration’s signature achievements to date involve substantial expansions of the federal
government’s role, be it through new federal legislation addressing
health insurance and financial sector reform or massive injections
of federal spending.1 Such expansions in the federal government’s
role frequently translate into restrictions on the states. New federal
legislation often preempts prior state regulation, and federal
spending often comes with substantial conditions and burdens for
the states. Not surprisingly, many state officials have sharply criticized these developments at the federal level, often invoking federalism as their fighting flag.2
Yet the story of federalism’s fate under the Obama administration
is not so simple. To be sure, these national developments entail
some preemption and new state burdens. But each also has brought
with it significant regulatory and financial opportunities for the
states. States play a pivotal role in implementing the new federal
health insurance legislation, with responsibilities ranging from
creating and operating the health insurance exchanges to overseeing premium rate increases to running expanded Medicaid pro-

1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18,
22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.);
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
2. The most prominent opposition to the ACA has taken the form of lawsuits, brought
by state governors and attorneys general among others, alleging that key provisions exceed
Congress’s commerce, spending, and tax powers and violate the Tenth Amendment. See infra
note 27. Several Republican governors—most prominently Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, Rick
Perry of Texas, and Mark Sanford of South Carolina—also protested the federal government’s
use of stimulus funds, both generally and in the context of specific programs such as Race to
the Top. See Michael Luo, Jobless Angry at Possibility of Losing Out on Benefits, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2009, at A13 (reporting that nine Republican governors protested receipt of federal
stimulus funds); Letter from Rick Perry, Gov. of Tex., to Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ.
(Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/files/press-office/O-DuncanArne
201001130344.pdf (“Texas will not be submitting an application for RTTT funds.”).

2011]

FEDERALISM UNDER OBAMA

569

grams.3 States also have increased regulatory responsibilities under
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), which takes a notably restrictive approach to preemption.4 Preemption by federal administrative agencies has been
further curtailed by President Obama’s Preemption Memorandum,
issued early in his administration, instructing agencies that preemption “should be undertaken only with full consideration of the
legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal
basis for preemption.”5 Furthermore, a substantial amount of the
stimulus funding went to the states, cushioning the effects of the
financial crisis on state employment and operations and representing the greatest increase in flexible federal financial aid to the
states in thirty years.6
Rather than assertions of federal power at the expense of the
states, the central dynamic evident under the Obama administration to date is more active government, at both the national and
state level. States are given significant room to shape their participation in the new federal initiatives, as well as enhanced regulatory
authority and expanded resources to do so.7 States that are eager to
play a greater regulatory role and support the new federal policies
therefore have much to gain. But states that choose to stay on the
sidelines face the prospect of direct federal intervention or loss of
access to substantial federal funds, and their ability to pursue their
preferred regulatory (or deregulatory) strategies may be curtailed.8
Put differently, federalism under the Obama administration is
federalism in service of progressive policy, not a general devolution

3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Regarding
Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Preemption
Memo]. Although more cautious about preemption generally, the Obama administration has
supported claims of preemption in several contexts. See infra Part I.D.
6. See Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. Posner, Inflection Point? Federalism and the Obama
Administration, 41 PUBLIUS 421, 426 (2011) (describing how ARRA’s “principal initiatives ...
were designed in large part to help cushion state budgets” and “minimize layoffs”); Thomas
L. Gais, Federalism During the Obama Administration 6 (May 7, 2010) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/ 2010-05-07federalism_during_obama_administration.pdf (describing financial aid to states).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.A.

570

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:567

of power and resources to the states.9 Some might dispute that
granting states a role to play in advancing a policy agenda emanating from Washington represents federalism at all.10 At a minimum,
the Obama administration experience puts front and center the
debate over whether federalism has any principled, apolitical basis
or is instead simply invoked when it serves to advance a favored
political result.11 Yet this experience also suggests that, even in
areas in which the national government has constitutional authority
to set policy and federalism operates at best as a second-order
concern, the result can still be substantial and potentially lasting
protection of state authority.12
Equally significant, the experience so far under the Obama
administration highlights the central importance of the administrative sphere to modern-day federalism. Critical decisions about
the actual scope of state powers and autonomy will be made not in
Congress or in the courts, but in the halls of agencies like the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Education.13 True, federal administrative agencies have
long had substantial power over the shape of nation-state relationships, but the recent regulatory developments expand that power
considerably.14 Indications so far suggest that federal agencies have
pulled back from more aggressive preemption practices and are

9. The Obama administration’s affinity with the “progressive federalism” movement was
noted early on. See John Schwartz, Obama Seems To Be Open to a Broader Role for the States,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A16 (describing this movement as one “in which governors and
activist state attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on environmental initiatives,
consumer protection, and other issues”). See generally Symposium, Progressive Federalism,
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2009).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
11. For arguments that federalism does not have an apolitical basis, see Frank B. Cross,
Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1999) (“[F]ederalism is consistently
(and I contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other
ideological end.”); Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131,
137 (2004) (“Elected officials invoke federalism when it comports with their substantive policy
preferences, but they otherwise do not care about the federal-state balance.”); see also Edward
L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV.
903, 914 (1994) (“[M]any standard arguments advanced for federalism are clearly nothing
more than policy arguments for decentralization.”).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 190-96.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.

2011]

FEDERALISM UNDER OBAMA

571

allowing states to exercise genuine implementation discretion
—indeed at times actively soliciting state partnerships.15
A particularly interesting feature of the Obama administration
initiatives, moreover, is their use of administrative structures that
not only deeply embed the states in federal program implementation
but also give the states a role in setting the content of federal
regulatory standards and even overseeing federal agency performance.16 These structures raise the question of how institutional
design can be used to foster greater administrative attentiveness to
federalism concerns, as well as underscore the role states can play
in reforming federal agencies.17 These structures also highlight the
important role that administrative law can play in supplementing
political and administrative checks on federal overreaching.18
In Part I of what follows, I begin by describing three major legislative initiatives under the Obama administration that have
substantial federalism implications: the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Dodd-Frank, and the federal stimulus (officially known as American Reinvestment and Recovery Act), with
particular focus on the use of stimulus funds in the Department of
Education’s Race to the Top program. I also describe significant
moves the administration has made on the preemption front, both
restricting and supporting preemption claims. In Part II, I assess
the implications of these developments for federalism, emphasizing
both the central pro-regulatory dynamic and the critical importance
of administrative federalism.
I. FOUR FEDERALISM DEVELOPMENTS
The most notable federalism developments under the Obama
administration have occurred largely in the legislative sphere. This
Part offers a description of three major pieces of legislation—the
health insurance and financial sector reform measures and the
Recovery Act—that are particularly significant from a federalism
perspective. It also details related administrative developments
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra text accompanying notes 201-06, 212-20.
See infra text accompanying notes 212-16.
See infra text accompanying notes 221-23.
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that have had substantial impact on the states, including the
Department of Education’s Race to the Top program and the
administration’s position on preemption.
A. The Affordable Care Act and Health Insurance Reform
Perhaps the signal achievement of the Obama administration to
date is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,
known as the Affordable Care Act or ACA for short.19 The ACA
undertakes a major overhaul of health insurance, imposing substantial new federal requirements and expanding health insurance
to 32 million of the nation’s 55 million uninsured.20 Critical features
of the legislation include: prohibitions on insurance companies
discriminating against individuals based on preexisting conditions
or imposing caps on benefits;21 a requirement that individuals purchase insurance along with premium subsidies for those below certain income thresholds;22 regulation of insurance premium increases
and the amount insurance companies spend on non-medically
related expenses;23 expansion of Medicaid to cover all individuals
under 133 percent of the poverty line;24 extension of children’s
eligibility for insurance under their parents until the age of 26;25
19. Or as “ObamaCare” by conservatives, which though ideologically laden does convey
the measure’s importance to the administration. See, e.g., Pam Bondi, Op-Ed., The State
Versus ObamaCare, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2011, at A15.
20. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 9-10 (Mar. 20, 2010) [hereinafter CBO Pelosi
Letter], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf
(estimating ACA’s effect on insurance coverage).
21. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1201, § 2704, 124 Stat. 119, 154-55 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, and 300gg-3) (coverage for preexisting conditions,
mandating guaranteed issue of insurance, and limiting factors on which premium can be set
to family size, age, tobacco use, and community rating); id. sec. 1001, § 2711, 124 Stat. at 131
(prohibiting “lifetime limits” and “unreasonable annual limits” on dollar value of benefits).
22. See id. sec. 1501, 124 Stat. at 242-49 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42
U.S.C.) (individual mandate); id. secs. 1401, 1402, 124 Stat. at 213-24 (tax credits and reduced
cost-sharing).
23. See id. sec. 1201, § 2701, 124 Stat. at 155-56 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg)
(prohibiting discriminatory premium rates); id. sec. 1001, § 2718, 124 Stat. at 136-37
(requiring insurance companies to spend less than 20-25 percent of premium revenue on “nonclaims costs”).
24. See id. sec. 2001(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 271 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
25. See id. sec. 1001, § 2714, 124 Stat. at 132 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14).
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and the creation of new health exchanges that the states will run.26
Of these, the requirement that individuals obtain a minimum level
of health insurance—popularly referred to as the individual
mandate—has generated the most attention and attack. Based on
health insurance reforms adopted by Massachusetts in 2006, this
requirement has provoked numerous lawsuits, including one by
Virginia and another by a group of twenty-six states filed in Florida,
all alleging that it exceeds the scope of Congress’s constitutional
authority.27
Despite this attention and constitutional federalism focus, the
minimum coverage requirement is not the ACA provision that on its
face is of greatest significance to the states.28 Although it preempts
state legislation stipulating that individuals should not have to
obtain insurance,29 the requirement applies to individuals rather
26. See id. secs. 1311-1313, 124 Stat. at 173-85 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). For more information on health benefit exchanges and their implementation, see
generally ROBERT CAREY, PUB. CONSULTING GRP., HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: KEY ISSUES
FOR STATE IMPLEMENTATION (2010), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70388.pdf;
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT ARE HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGES? (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908.pdf.
27. See Virginia v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding Virginia lacks
standing to challenge the mandate and dismissing Virginia’s suit); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
individual mandate exceeds Congress’s commerce and tax powers); see also Liberty Univ. v.
Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (dismissing challenge
to the mandate as exceeding Congress’s powers after concluding challenge was a preenforcement action seeking to restrain assessment of a tax and barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding the
mandate is a valid exercise of the commerce power). I have argued elsewhere that the
mandate is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s tax, commerce, and necessary and proper
powers. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellees, Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d 529 (No. 10-2388), 2011 WL 1653754;
Gillian Metzger, Our Pending National Debate: Is Healthcare Reform Constitutional?,
Remarks at the Hot Topic Panel Discussion for the AALS Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2011), in
62 MERCER L. REV. 633, 633-38 (2011).
28. Indeed, the challenge to the requirement individuals must purchase insurance as
being outside of Congress’s enumerated powers appears at base animated by individual
liberty concerns. See Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 565 (Sutton, J., concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that limitations on Congress’s power to compel activities are better
rooted in due process); see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)
(emphasizing the connection between federalism and individual liberty).
29. As of July 2011, eleven states have adopted such measures, either in anticipation of
the ACA or in response to it. See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging
Certain Health Reforms, 2011, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/?tabid=18906#New_laws (last updated July 12, 2011).
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than to the states themselves. Instead, the ACA provisions with
greatest direct impact on the states are the substantial expansion
of Medicaid and the creation of the health exchanges.30 The
expansion of those eligible for Medicaid will add 16 million to the
Medicaid rolls.31 Ordinarily, states are required to pay a substantial
part of Medicaid costs, with the federal-matching percentage
varying by state. But the federal government will pay the vast
majority of the costs attributable to the ACA’s expansion of the
Medicaid rolls, starting at 100 percent in 2014 and declining to 90
percent in 2020 and subsequent years.32 The federal government’s
covering of these costs represents a significant legislative victory for
the states.33 However, states still face greater administrative costs
as well as eventually 10 percent of new coverage costs. Furthermore,
30. As employers with more than fifty employees, states must provide qualifying health
insurance to their employees or pay an amount per employee, but that requirement is
generally true of employers of that size and is not specific to the states. See ACA sec. 1513,
124 Stat. at 253-56 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also id. sec. 1511, 124
Stat. at 252 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218A) (requiring employers of two hundred or more
employees to automatically enroll new employees in health insurance if the employers offer
health insurance to existing employees).
31. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATE BY STATE
RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/upload/Medicaid-Coverage-and-Spending-in-Health-Reform-National-and-StateBy-State-Results-for-Adults-at-or-Below-133-FPL.pdf; Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M.
Epstein, Medicaid Expansion—The Soft Underbelly of Health Care Reform?, 363 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2085, 2085 (2010); CBO Pelosi Letter, supra note 20, at 9.
32. States that had previously extended coverage to include individuals and families up
to 133 percent of the poverty line also get substantial subsidization of their efforts, though
slightly less than those states that had not previously expanded; their rate will be 93 percent
in 2014 and will similarly decline to 90 percent in 2020. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW 1-2 (Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter KFF HEALTH LAW
SUMMARY], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf; see also THE HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FINANCING NEW MEDICAID COVERAGE UNDER HEALTH REFORM: THE
ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES 1 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/upload/8072.pdf (estimating that, in practice, the federal government will pay
for 96 percent of Medicaid expansion over the next ten years). The ACA also extends the state
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and expands the federal contribution rate by
23 percent in 2015. See ACA sec. 2101, 124 Stat. at 286-88 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.); KFF HEALTH LAW SUMMARY, supra, at 2.
33. See John Dinan, State Government Influence in the Congressional Policy Process: The
Case of Health Care Legislation in the 111th Congress 6-8, 16-18, 26-32 (2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfra?abstract_id=1643301 (“The
clearest and most significant instance of state officials’ influence was their success in securing
more federal funding for individuals who were made eligible by the expansion of Medicaid.”).
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they are required to maintain their existing Medicaid and
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) eligibility and benefit
levels as a condition of receiving Medicaid funding.34 Concerns about
these additional costs have led some state legislators to raise the
possibility of leaving Medicaid, and the Florida litigation challenged
the Medicaid expansion as unconstitutionally coercive.35
The health exchanges—formally, American Health Benefit
Exchanges—are a centerpiece of the ACA’s effort to expand access
to health insurance.36 The exchanges are initially aimed at people
employed by small businesses or purchasing insurance individually,
with the goal of making insurance more affordable and accessible
by grouping together larger groups of enrollees.37 The Act envisions
that states will run the exchanges but provides for the federal
government to operate the exchange in a state if the state fails to do
so.38 Alternatively, a group of states can opt to operate a regional
exchange, or a state can choose to operate different exchanges in

34. See ACA sec. 2001(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 275-76 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a); id.
sec. 2101(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 286-87 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1397ee(d)) (requiring
“maintenance of effort” in Medicaid and CHIP coverage for states to receive federal subsidies);
EVELYNE BAUMRUCKER & BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMORANDUM
REGARDING VARIATION IN ANALYSES OF ACA’S FISCAL IMPACT ON STATES 4-7 (2010), available
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/58319559/crs-state-impact-of-PPACA (summarizing ACA
provisions with potential state cost implications); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 137 (2010) (“States also face additional administrative requirements
under ACA to coordinate Medicaid enrollment with other government and private health
insurance plans.”).
35. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1266-67, 1270 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (describing and rejecting this claim), aff’d in part,
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178,
at *23-24 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (rejecting coercion argument); Emily Ramshaw, Texas
Considers Medicaid Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
11/07/us/politics/07ttmedicaid.html (reporting that Texas legislators are discussing possibility
of withdrawing from Medicaid “more seriously than ever”).
36. See, e.g., ACA sec. 1311, 124 Stat. at 173-81 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
37. See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges,
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2011).
38. See ACA sec. 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173-74 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031)
(requiring states to establish health benefit exchanges). If HHS determines by January 1,
2013, that a state has failed to take necessary steps to create an exchange, HHS must create
an exchange itself or contract with a nonprofit to do so. See id. sec. 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186-87
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041).
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different parts of the state.39 HHS’s proposed regulations also offer
states the option of partnering with the federal government to run
the exchange.40 This reliance on state-run exchanges marks a significant difference between the Senate bill that became the ACA and
the earlier House version.41 The latter had assigned primary responsibility for operating a national uniform exchange to the federal
government, with states allowed to opt in to operate state-based exchanges if they met federal requirements.42 State officials lobbied
strongly for state-based exchanges and for states to retain broad
regulatory authority over insurance.43
The ACA stipulates some features of how the exchanges will
function: it requires exchanges to offer four tiers of insurance plans
and a catastrophic plan;44 certify health plans for participation
based on federal criteria;45 run call centers and maintain a website
that provides comparative data on plans and a calculator by which
consumers can calculate actual costs;46 determine eligibility for
39. See id. sec. 1311(f)(1), 124 Stat. at 174 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (allowing
states to establish “[r]egional or other interstate exchanges”); id. sec. 1333(a), 124 Stat. at
206-07 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18053) (providing for “health care choice compacts”
whereby states may agree to offer “1 or more qualified health plans ... in the individual
markets in all such States”).
40. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,870, 41,872 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155-156) [hereinafter Proposed Exchange Rule]; see also U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEWSROOM, AFFORDABLE INSURANCE EXCHANGES: CHOICES,
COMPETITION AND CLOUT FOR STATES 2-3 (July 11, 2001) (factsheet detailing elements of the
proposed exchange rule).
41. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).
42. See id. § 301 (proposing a national health insurance exchange run by the newly
created Health Choices Administration); id. § 308 (proposing optional operation of state-based
health insurance exchanges); see also America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R.
3200, 111th Cong. §§ 201, 208 (2009) (making the same proposals); Dinan, supra note 33, at
35 (noting that state officials persuaded lawmakers to allow state-run exchanges “due largely
to congress members’ recognition of state experience and expertise in this area”).
43. Dinan, supra note 33, at 9, 12-13, 35; see also Reed Abelson, Proposals Clash on States’
Roles in Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at B1 (“State regulators, too, argue that
their role [in establishing exchanges] is essential.”); Abbe R. Gluck, A Federalism Agenda for
the Age of Statutes: Intrastatutory Federalism in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 29) (on file with author) (“[T]he state/federal implementation balance ... was the key question that divided the House and Senate versions of the
legislation, and ultimately giving the states the leadership role was the ‘deal breaker.’”).
44. See KFF HEALTH LAW SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 5.
45. See ACA sec. 1311(d)(4)(A), (e), 124 Stat. at 176-79 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §18031).
46. See id. sec. 1311(d)(4)(B)-(C),(G), 124 Stat. at 176-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
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public support, such as Medicaid and premium subsidies, as well as
enroll eligible individuals;47 and certify if individuals are eligible for
exemptions from the coverage requirement.48 But it also leaves
many details about how the exchanges will operate up to HHS and
the states.49 One critical feature in the states’ control concerns the
form that health plan certification takes. States can use certification
as a mechanism by which to negotiate prices and benefits with insurers, as Massachusetts currently does. Alternatively, following
Utah’s lead, they could broadly certify any plan providing the
minimum benefits required, leaving price and benefit coverage to
be determined by the market. They can also choose an approach
somewhere between these extremes.50 States can also choose the
governance structure the exchange will take, in particular whether
to create the exchange as a governmental agency or as a nonprofit
organization.51 States can apply for funding from HHS to help cover
the substantial costs involved in getting the exchanges operational,
but the exchanges are required to be financially self-sustaining by
2015.52

18031).
47. See id. sec. 1311(d)(4)(F), 124 Stat. at 177 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
48. See id. sec. 1311(d)(4)(H), 124 Stat. at 177 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031); see
generally id. secs. 1302(b), 1321 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Planning
and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges, Request for Comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,584,
45,585-86 (Aug. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170) (outlining statutory requirements
of health exchanges); Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 37 (providing policy
guidance for implementation of exchanges).
49. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act:
Key Policy Issues, COMMONWEALTH FUND, 8, 10, 16, 20, 25-26 (2010), http://www.common
wealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jul/1426_Jost_hlt_insura
nce_exchanges_ACA.pdf (noting flexibility for states in operating exchanges); Alan Weil, State
Policymakers’ Priorities for Successful Implementation of Health Reform, BRIEFING (Nat’l
Acad. for State Health Policy, Portland, Me.), May 2010, at 2 (“States have many choices with
respect to the exchange.”).
50. See Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note 40, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41891-92; Robert Pear,
Health Care Overhaul Depends on States’ Insurance Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at
A23; see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/guidance_to_states_on_
exchanges.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (initial HHS guidance indicating states would have
discretion in structuring exchanges).
51. See ACA sec. 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 176 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031);
Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note 40, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,827.
52. ACA sec. 1311(a), (d)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 173, 178 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
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As a result of their control over health exchanges, the states will
have substantial influence over the shape that the ACA takes on
the ground. States and state officials play important roles in other
respects as well.53 Along with HHS, state insurance commissioners
and the exchanges are charged with enforcing substantive protections contained in the ACA and HHS regulations against insurance companies, such as prohibitions on discriminating against
preexisting conditions and on unreasonable premium increases.54 In
some states, such enforcement may require changes in state law to
ensure that state commissioners are authorized to enforce federal
requirements.55 An organization of state officials, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), is also assigned
significant responsibilities under the Act. In particular, NAIC
determines what expenses count as medically related for purposes
of deciding whether insurers are failing to spend an adequate
amount on health care and, as a result, owe policyholders rebates.56
53. See Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the
Tensions of Federalism, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2244, 2244 (2010) (“[States’] new
responsibilities include securing immediate access to high-risk pools for all eligible
Americans, implementing an array of insurance-market reforms on an ongoing basis, and
eventually establishing health insurance exchanges.”); Alan Weil & Raymond Scheppach, New
Roles for States in Health Reform Implementation, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1178, 1178-79 (2010)
(noting that states must establish new Medicaid eligibility rules, modify insurance regulations, and seek grants in implementing health reform, in addition to operating exchanges);
Joanne Kenen, National Reform Meets Politics in the States, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2010, at A11
(describing state roles and different types of state responses).
54. See, e.g., ACA sec. 1001, § 2718(b), 124 Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-18) (enforcing rebates for non-claims costs over state-determined percentages); id. sec.
1003, § 2794, 124 Stat. at 139-40 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94) (requiring state
review of premium increases and reporting on trends); id. sec. 1311(c), 124 Stat. at 174 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (requiring certification of health plans).
55. See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://
www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_section_letter_kathleen_sebelius.pdf
(reporting NAIC survey indicating that half of states had the general ability to enforce federal
law and almost all states could hold insurers accountable for compliance with federal
requirements by other means, such as their power to approve insurance forms).
56. See ACA sec. 1001, § 2718(d), 124 Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18)
(requiring Secretary to define what costs are medically related “in consultation with the
National Association of Insurance Commissions”). HHS recently issued an interim final rule
largely deferring to NAIC’s determinations. See Robert Pear, New Rules Tell Insurers: Spend
More on Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at A22 (“The rules generally follow
recommendations from the [NAIC].”). For the text of the interim final rule, see generally
Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the
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HHS is instructed to consult with NAIC and other state stakeholders on a variety of issues central to the ACA’s implementation
and has undertaken weekly phone calls open to all the states as well
as numerous meetings with state officials.57
The Act also grants states significant flexibility and freedom to
experiment. Starting in 2017, they can apply for a waiver from
many of the ACA’s requirements, and legislation is pending that
would move up the availability of waivers to 2014, when many of the
ACA’s requirements for the states go into effect.58 The ACA preempts state laws only to the extent they prevent application of the
ACA’s requirements, and thus states are free to add additional
protections for consumers.59 States can also choose to require plans
to provide additional benefits beyond the essential health benefits
specified by HHS, but if they do so they must cover the cost of those
additional benefits for those individuals participating in the exchanges.60 How much flexibility the states actually have in practice
will depend to a large degree on HHS, which has authority to issue
regulations on a number of issues of particular importance to the
states—such as requirements that state health exchanges must
meet to be deemed adequate and the content of essential health
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158) [hereinafter Medical Loss Ratio Interim Rule].
57. See, e.g., ACA sec. 1321(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 186 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041); id.
sec. 1333(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 206 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18053); Telephone Interview
with Alan Weil, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Acad. for State Health Policy (Feb. 4, 2011).
58. See ACA sec. 1332, 124 Stat. at 203-06 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18052); see also
Application, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg.
13,553 (proposed Mar. 14, 2011) (proposed procedures for section 1332 waiver process). States
can also provide “Basic Health Programs” for individuals with incomes between 133 and 200
percent of the poverty level, in lieu of their obtaining health care through an exchange. See
ACA sec. 1331, 124 Stat. at 199-203 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18051); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS, PREEMPTION AND STATE FLEXIBILITY IN ACA 2 (2010), available at http://www.
naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_general_preemption_and_state_flex_ppaca.pdf
[hereinafter NAIC, PREEMPTION]. President Obama recently endorsed a bipartisan bill currently pending in Congress that would allow waivers to be granted in 2014, but it is not clear
that House Republicans will be willing to amend rather than repeal the law. See Empowering
States to Innovate Act, S. 3958, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack,
Altering Stand on Health Law, Obama Offers Waiver Option, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A1.
59. See ACA sec. 1321(d), 124 Stat. at 187 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041); NAIC,
PREEMPTION, supra note 58, at 1 (“If a state already has a requirement that at least meets the
federal standards, or adopts one in the future, then it would retain the authority to enforce
it.”).
60. See ACA sec. 1323(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 193-94 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18043).
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benefits—which will determine the amount states must pay to
subsidize any additional state mandates.61
States’ responses to the ACA to date have varied tremendously.
A number of states have joined the litigation challenging its
constitutionality,62 but until recently most states appeared to be
preparing to implement at least some of the ACA’s requirements.63
States are most engaged with preparing for the Medicaid expansion,
which can start in 2011 but must occur by 2014.64 Some states are
also taking a lead on developing health exchanges and implementing other features of the Act, such as the high-risk insurance
pools that have already gone into effect.65 Others, however, are
significantly less active. Twenty-three states, for example, declined
to set up a high-risk pool, leaving HHS with the task of administer61. See id. sec. 1302(b), 124 Stat. at 163-65 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022) (requiring
Secretary to define essential health benefits); id. sec. 1311(c), 124 Stat. at 174-75 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (requiring Secretary to set standards for certification of health
plans); id. sec. 1311(d)(3), 124 Stat. at 196 (requiring the states to cover cost of mandated
benefits above essential benefits).
62. Or more accurately, a number of state attorneys general and governors have brought
challenges; in several states, the Attorney General and Governor disagree on the Act’s
constitutionality, and only one official is participating. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Ritter Among
Dem Governors in Battle over Health Care Law, DENVER POST, Oct. 16, 2010, at B1 (noting
this disagreement in Colorado, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Washington); Josh Goodman,
Health Care Tests the Independence of Attorneys General, GOVERNING POLITICS BLOG (Mar.
25, 2010), http://www.governing.com/blogs/politics/Health-Care-Tests-the.html (comparing
disagreement in Michigan between pro-lawsuit Attorney General and anti-lawsuit Governor
with disagreement in Georgia between pro-lawsuit Governor and anti-lawsuit Attorney
General).
63. See Kenen, supra note 53, at A15 (“There is an understanding that opposition does not
equal no one getting to work on this.” (quoting Alan Weil, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Acad. for State
Health Policy)). According to HHS, by July 2011 forty-nine states had accepted federal grants
to help plan and operate health exchanges and over half had taken additional implementing
action. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Newsroom, Affordable Insurance
Exchanges: States Are Leading the Way, HEALTHCARE.GOV (July 11, 2011), http://www.
healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/exchanges07112011d.html. Yet resistance to taking federal
funding for ACA implementation efforts appears to be growing. See Thomas Kaplan, G.O.P.
Senators in Albany Block Federal Aid To Fulfill Part of Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2011, at A18.
64. See ACA sec. 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396) (requiring
expansion by January 1, 2014); id. sec. 2001(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 274 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396(a)) (allowing state expansion as early as January 1, 2011).
65. See Walecia Konrad, High-Risk Insurance Pools To Begin Next Month, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2010, at B6 (noting thirty states had opted to run high-risk insurance pools); Jessica
B. Mulholland, A National Model?, GOVERNING, Nov. 2010 (noting California’s pioneering
efforts in establishing its health exchange).
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ing the pool for residents of these states.66 In addition, suggestions
of increased resistance to implementation are surfacing. Several
states have indicated they will not operate health exchanges, and by
mid-2011 only twelve states have legislation in place authorizing a
state exchange.67 Some others are now taking a much slower approach toward implementation and are favoring a more minimalist
exchange model.68 By contrast, Vermont recently adopted legislation
adopting a single-payer health system.69
B. Dodd-Frank and Financial Sector Reform
States are less critical to direct implementation of financial sector
reforms enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act. The primary focus of
Dodd-Frank is on reforming the structure and authority of federal
financial regulators. For example, Dodd-Frank creates a Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), charged with identifying and
responding to risks to the stability of the nation’s financial system,70
66. See Kevin Sack, High-Risk Insurance Pools Are Attracting Far Fewer Takers than
Projected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A19.
67. See Robert Pear, Obama Administration Rolls Out Standards for Health Insurance
Marketplaces, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at A12 (reporting that measures to create exchanges
failed in another nine states, based on data from the National Conference of State
Legislatures); Jennifer Haberkorn & Sarah Kliff, Jindal: No Exchange Here—E&C To Move
on Med-Mal Bill-Pro-Reformers: Senior Day-NGA Move on Medicaid Flexibility Task Force,
POLITICO (Apr. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/politicopulse/0311/politicopulse
461.html (stating that Louisiana and Florida definitely do not plan on implementing health
insurance exchanges and that Montana, Georgia, and Alaska are likely to follow suit); see also
Kaplan, supra note 63, at A18 (noting several states are returning or rejecting federal funds
to assist with setting up exchanges).
68. See Joe Carlson, Minnesota Work-Around, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20101018/MAGAZINE/101019978 (chronicling
effort by Minnesota trade associations and state agencies to circumvent Governor Tim
Pawlenty’s opposition and send a comment letter to HHS regarding structure of health
exchanges); Kevin Sack, Republicans Rise to Power, With Enmity for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2010, at A13 (“[I]n the 20 states that will have a unified Republican government, up
from only nine today, Republicans can be expected to embrace a less regulatory and more
market-driven approach.”).
69. See David Goodman, Vermont Passes Single Payer Care, World Doesn’t End, MOTHER
JONES, May 30, 2011, http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/05/vermont-single-payer-healthcare. For the single-payer system to go into effect, HHS will need to grant Vermont a waiver
from the ACA’s requirements. See id.
70. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, secs. 111-112, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-98
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322).
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and provides federal regulators with resolution authority for systemically important firms in danger of defaulting.71 Yet even in
these contexts state officials are given a role to play. The Secretary
of the Treasury chairs the FSOC, which consists of the chair or
leader of the main federal financial agencies, such as the Federal
Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).72 However, three state
officials—a banking supervisor, an insurance commissioner, and a
securities commissioner—are nonvoting members of the FSOC and
must be allowed to participate in its meetings and deliberations
unless a majority of the FSOC votes to exclude them to safeguard
confidential information and the Secretary of Treasury, as chair,
agrees.73
The states are particularly important in two substantive areas
Dodd-Frank addresses—consumer financial protection and insurance regulation.74 Both of these are areas of traditional state
71. See id. secs. 203-205, 210, 124 Stat. at 1450-56, 1460 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
72. See id. sec. 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1392-93 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
73. Id. sec. 111(b)(2)-(3), 124 Stat. at 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The Act
leaves the process of selecting a single representative to serve on the council to the state
banking supervisors, insurance commissioners, and securities commissioners, id., and sets
their terms at two years. Id. sec. 111(c), 124 Stat. at 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
A question might arise as to whether this process of selection raises Appointments Clause
problems, but the state officials’ status as nonvoting members may preclude their being
considered either principal or inferior officers. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that
principal officers must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, whereas
Congress may vest appointment of inferior officers in the President, courts of law, or heads
of departments). The Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, and the North American Securities Administrators’ Association
recently chose state representatives for the Council. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs, State Regulators Announce Choices for the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2010_docs/huff_appointed_fsoc.
htm.
74. Dodd-Frank affects other areas of traditional state regulation as well, such as
corporate governance and regulation of credit agencies. See Dodd-Frank Act secs. 971-972, 124
Stat. at 1915 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 2010-2011 Policies for
the Jurisdiction of the Communications, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=854,15,690 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011)
(“Corporate governance, securities regulation and enforcement of securities laws are areas
where the federal government and the states traditionally share regulatory authority.”).
Additionally, states may be significantly affected by federal regulation of the municipal fund
industry authorized by Dodd-Frank, such as new restrictions the SEC has imposed on pay-toplay practices in that context. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment
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involvement, with Congress going so far as to delegate primary
responsibility for regulating insurance to the states in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.75 States have been particularly
active on the consumer protection front in recent years, especially
on issues related to mortgage abuses, and have clashed repeatedly
with the OCC over enforcement of state consumer protection laws
against national banks and their subsidiaries.76 Two of these clashes
reached the Supreme Court, with mixed results: in Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., the Court held that the National Bank Act
(NBA) preempted state efforts to undertake oversight of statechartered subsidiaries of national banks engaging in real estate
lending activities,77 whereas in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n it rejected the OCC’s effort to read the NBA as preempting states’ efforts
to judicially enforce state banking laws against national banks.78
Dodd-Frank clearly sides with the states on these issues, enacting
provisions codifying the result in Cuomo and overturning Watters.79
More generally, the Act takes a restrictive approach toward preemption, providing that only inconsistent state law is preempted;
providing that state laws offering greater protection to consumers
are not inconsistent for that reason; and requiring that a state
consumer financial law must be preempted only if the state law
discriminates against national banks or “prevents or significantly
interferes with the exercise by a national bank of its powers” as

Advisers Act of 1940, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052, 77,070 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
76. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds
to the Subprime Financial Crisis, and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System
and Consumer Protection, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR REFORM 295, 307-10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds] (“Despite these initiatives by the states, the
OCC’s actions seriously obstructed the states’ ability to protect consumers from predatory
lending practices.”); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 70-80 (2005) (describing conflict between states
and OCC); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,
23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004) (detailing broad preemption efforts by the OCC).
77. 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007).
78. 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721-22 (2009).
79. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, sec. 1042(a), (d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552); id. sec. 1044(a), § 5136C, 124 Stat. at 2014-15 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 25b).
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determined by a court or by the OCC “on a case-by-case basis.”80 In
addition, the OCC may not make a preemption determination
unless “substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding,
supports the specific finding regarding ... preemption,” and courts
are to assess the thoroughness and consistency of OCC preemption
determinations—as well as other factors the court deems relevant—in assessing the validity of preemption determinations.81
Although the OCC retains the power to preempt inconsistent state
laws by regulation, these restrictions make clear that Congress
intended to cut back on the OCC’s preemption authority.82
Equally significant are Dodd-Frank’s provisions with respect to
the ability of states to enforce federal consumer protection requirements. Concerns that prudential financial regulators had repeatedly
failed to enforce consumer protection laws against financial institutions—and that they would continue to do so, given their prime
focus on preserving institutions’ financial stability and potential
capture by the institutions they regulate—led to calls for creation
of an independent federal regulator focused solely on consumer
protection.83 Dodd-Frank ultimately created the new Bureau of
80. Id. sec. 1044, § 5136C(b)(1), (3), 124 Stat. at 2014-15 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b);
see also id. sec. 1041(a), 124 Stat. at 2011-12 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551) (providing
that only inconsistent state laws are preempted and greater state consumer protection does
not create inconsistency). This general preemption standard is intended to codify the
preemption standard contained in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). See DoddFrank Act, sec. 1044, § 5136C(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b).
81. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044, § 5136C(c), 124 Stat. at 2016 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 25b).
82. See, e.g., id. sec. 1044, § 5136C(b)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 25b) (requiring that the OCC consult with, and take account of the views of, the new Federal
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau before preempting state law); id. sec. 1044, §
5136C(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 2016 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b) (requiring that the OCC
review its preemption determinations at least every five years). The OCC recently issued final
regulations that some attack as at odds with Dodd-Frank’s limits on preemption. See Dodd
Frank Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549-01 (July 21, 2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, OCC Gets
It Wrong on Preemption, Again, AM. BANKER, July 29, 2011, at 8 (arguing that OCC’s rules
“blatantly violate the Dodd-Frank Act”).
83. See, e.g., Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products
Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 35 (2009) (statement of
Edmund Mierzwinsky, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(stating that consumer groups strongly support proposed Consumer Financial Protection
Agency); id. at 51 (statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation
of America) (“CFA strongly supports creating a Federal consumer protection agency focused
on credit and payment products because it targets the most significant underlying causes of
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Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB). The CFPB is located in the
Federal Reserve (Fed) but headed by a Director who has removal
and term of office protection, and the CFPB is guaranteed a certain
percentage of the Fed’s budget.84 In addition, the Fed lacks power to
oversee CFPB proceedings or review the CFPB’s rules and orders;
instead, CFPB regulations can only be stayed or set aside by the
FSOC on a two-thirds vote.85 The states, however, are granted some
authority to force the CFPB to act: “The Bureau shall issue a notice
of proposed rulemaking whenever a majority of the States has enacted a resolution in support of the establishment or modification
of a consumer protection regulation by the Bureau.”86 Moreover,
although the states are not allowed to enforce the consumer
protection provisions of Dodd-Frank directly against national banks
and federal savings associations, they are expressly granted power
to enforce regulations issued by the CFPB and to enforce the Act
against state-chartered entities.87 In addition, Elizabeth Warren,
who was charged with getting the new CFPB up and running,
actively encouraged state attorneys general to be involved in enforcement,88 and President Obama recently nominated a former
Ohio Attorney General as the CFPB Director.89
the massive regulatory failures that have harmed millions of Americans.”); id. (statement of
Elizabeth Warren, Professor, Harvard Law School) (proposing new Consumer Financial
Protection Agency).
84. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1011(a), (c), 124 Stat. at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491);
id. sec. 1017, 124 Stat. at 1975-76 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497).
85. Id. sec. 1012(c), 124 Stat. at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492); id. sec. 1023(a),
124 Stat. at 1985 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).
86. Id. sec. 1041(c), 124 Stat. at 2011-12 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551). The Act also
specifies factors that the CFPB is to consider and discuss in deciding whether to adopt such
a standard and requires that if it decides not to adopt a final regulation, it publish that
determination in the Federal Register; and further requires that it notify Congress and the
requesting states of its determination. Id. A report by the National Association of Attorneys
General reads the requirement that states must have “enacted a resolution” as indicating that
“the process is triggered only by official legislative action from a majority of States” and as
suggesting “the states must actually submit a joint request to the Bureau.” NAT’L ASS’N OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: SUMMARY FOR
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 4 (2010), available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/pubs/wallstreet-reform-UB.pdf.
87. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1042, 124 Stat. at 2012-14 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
88. Carter Dougherty, Warren Recruits Dodd-Frank Enforcers from 50 States, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 2, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-02/elizabethwarren-recruits-dodd-frank-enforcers-from-50-states.html.
89. Binyamin Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General To Head New Consumer Agency,
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Insurance regulation is another area in which Dodd-Frank preserved an important state role. During the financial crisis, failure
of the insurance giant AIG and several financial guarantee insurers
like Ambac raised questions about whether insurance regulation
should be federalized.90 States lobbied largely successfully for
preservation of their traditional oversight of insurance.91 Although
the Act creates a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the
Federal Reserve to monitor the insurance industry and report to
Congress on how to modernize and improve insurance regulation—including whether state regulation leads to gaps in consumer
protection and issues of uniformity—the FIO has very limited regulatory authority.92 It can preempt state insurance measures that are
inconsistent with international agreements and result in less
favorable treatment of foreign insurers, and it can recommend that
the FSOC designate an insurer subject to regulation as a systemically important nonbank financial company.93 But Dodd-Frank
expressly preserves other state insurance measures and denies both
the FIO and the Treasury Department any “general supervisory or
regulatory authority” over insurance.94 The inclusion of a state
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at B1.
90. See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41372, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: INSURANCE PROVISIONS 1 (2010).
91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Leah Campbell, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, to Clients
8 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFile
Upload5686%5C3483%5CInsurance-Industry-Implications-of-Dodd-Frank-Act.pdf
(“Determinations of an inconsistency will be subject to de novo judicial review, a provision
favored by such groups as ... [NAIC] and the Property Casualty Insurers Association of
America and initially rejected by Senate conferees.”); Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs
to Barney Frank, Chairman, House Fin. Servs. Comm. (June 3, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_100603_officers_letter_fin_reg_reform.pdf (“We
thank you for working with ... [NAIC] to include several necessary safeguards to ensure state
insurance supervision is preserved, and not unintentionally undermined, within the
framework of the legislation.”).
92. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 502(a), § 313(c), (p), 124 Stat. at 1580, 1585-87.
93. Id. sec. 502(a), § 313(c)(1), (p), 124 Stat. at 1580-81, 1585-87.
94. Id. sec. 502(a), § 313(k), 124 Stat. at 1585. Congress’s choice of the FIO in lieu of a
more powerful Office of National Insurance contained in the Senate version also reflected
state influence. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 502 (2010) (proposing establishment of Office of
National Insurance). State groups were mixed on the FIO, with the NAIC in particular
supporting its creation and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators opposed. See
Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs to Senators (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_100420_rafsa.pdf (“The NAIC strongly urges the
Senate to strike the Office of National Insurance language and replace it with the House-
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insurance commissioner and the Director of the FIO as nonvoting
members of the FSOC—as well as inclusion of the other state
financial regulatory officials as nonvoting members—represented a
conference compromise between the Senate and House versions of
the proposed bill.95
C. The Recovery Act, Fiscal Federalism, and Race to the Top
Despite the substantive regulatory import of the ACA and DoddFrank, the measure that has had the greatest impact on the states
under the Obama administration to date is the Recovery Act, the
economic stimulus legislation that was enacted shortly after
President Obama’s inauguration.96 A little over a third, or $282
billion, of the $787 billion in stimulus funds went to or through the
states, more than any previous stimulus measure.97 The Recovery
Act also included substantial amounts of local government funding,
and many of the funds states received, such as money for transporpassed Federal Insurance Office (FIO) language.”); Letter from Nat’l Conference of Ins.
Legislators to Barney Frank, Chairman, House Fin. Servs. Comm. (Oct. 23, 2009), available
at http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2009/10272009October23Letter.pdf (“We continue to
disagree with the necessity for such an office and question its accountability and effectiveness.
We believe that state regulation is successfully guiding insurers through the current economic
downturn.”).
95. As passed by the House on December 11, 2009, the bill included state insurance,
banking, and securities regulators as nonvoting members, as well as the Director of the
Federal Insurance Office. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., § 111(b)(2) (2009). The version that the
Senate introduced, as well as that which passed on May 20, 2010, as an amendment to H.R.
4173, provided only for the Director of the Office of Financial Research as a nonvoting
member who could not be excluded from Council meetings. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 111(b)(2)
(2010); H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 111(b)(2) (as amended by the Senate, May 20, 2010). The
Senate language formed the conference base text, but the version reported out of conference
contained all three state officials as nonvoting members, as well as the Directors of the Office
of Financial Research and the Federal Insurance Office. H. R. REP. NO. 111-517, sec. 111(b)(2),
at 18 (2010).
96. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
97. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-199, RECOVERY ACT: OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE MANAGEMENT AND STRENGTHEN ACCOUNTABILITY OVER STATES’ AND LOCALITIES’
USES OF FUNDS 4 (2010) [hereinafter RECOVERY ACT REPORT] (identifying $282 billion of
Recovery Act funds for programs administered by states and localities); see also Erin Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2011) (discussing the strong state lobbying
for stimulus funds); Gais, supra note 6, at 6-9 (identifying amount as $246 billion and a
greater percentage of GDP than any previous stimulus).
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tation or education assistance, were passed through to localities.98
These funds proved critical to states and localities facing huge
budget deficits during the recent economic crisis, with $160 billion
aimed at helping states cover health and education costs, the two
largest components of state budgets. In particular, the Recovery
Act included additional Medicaid funding and new State Fiscal
Stabilization Funds for education, which together totaled almost
$141 billion.99 The net effect was to increase the federal share of
total state budgets significantly, up to 34.7 percent in fiscal 2010
from 26.3 percent in fiscal 2008.100
As significant, the Recovery Act included a substantial amount in
flexible aid to states. According to Timothy Conlan and Paul Posner,
“[f]ederal aid as a percentage of state-local spending was estimated
to be ... [at] a level not seen since 1980.”101 Although states were
98. See, e.g., ARRA, div. A, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. at 182 (requiring the state to subgrant funds
to local education agencies for school improvement programs); id. sec. 807(a)(2), 123 Stat. at
190 (authorizing Secretary of Education to require states to make fast payments to local
educational agencies); id. div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 206-07 (providing that states must
allocate 30 percent of the amounts they receive in highway funding to localities).
99. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
REINVESTMENT ACT 4 app. A (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATE
IMPLEMENTATION] (on file with author) (“States will receive approximately $87 billion in
funding through enhancements of the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), [and]
$53.6 billion through a new State Fiscal Stabilization Fund for education.”); Olatunde C. A.
Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 154, 172-79 (2011) (describing
different categories of stimulus funding). This funding included $87 billion in Medicaid funds;
$53.6 billion in State Fiscal Stabilization Funds, of which $39.5 billion was for K-12 education; and an additional $26 billion in Title I and special education funds. See NAT’L
GOVERNORS ASS’N, ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 1 (2009) [hereinafter NGA, ANALYSIS], available at http://web.archive.org/web/20110317001900/http://www.
nga.org/files/pdf/ARRAANALYSIS.pdf; NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION,
supra. An additional $25.6 billion went to fund highway projects, resulting in the nowcommon sight of road construction identified by signs as paid for by the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act; $8.76 billion to transit projects; and $8.2 billion for energy efficiency
and weatherization projects. See RECOVERY ACT REPORT, supra note 97, at 56, 79, 100.
100. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL
SURVEY OF STATES, at viii (2010), available at http://nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=C6q1M3kxaEY%3D&tabid=83. States stand to gain substantial additional funding through
other initiatives, such as the Affordability Act, Medicaid expansion, and CHIP reauthorization. See Gais, supra note 6, at 10.
101. Conlan & Posner, supra note 6, at 424. On Medicaid MOE and other requirements,
see NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note 99, at 15-16. But see Gais, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that
ARRA funds came with strings attached, including an expectation to use the funds in ways
“agreeable to Congress and the Administration”).

2011]

FEDERALISM UNDER OBAMA

589

subject to maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements for many of
these funds, the economic recession resulted in expanded demand
for Medicaid, and the effect of increased federal funding was thus to
free states from having to devote additional resources to meeting
this new demand.102 Similarly, the education funds were aimed at
making up shortfalls in state revenues, and the law provided that
the Department of Education could waive or modify the MOE
requirements unless the state reduced the proportion of total state
revenues going to K-12 education.103 The Act contained immediate
obligation demands, with states required to use the funds given or
lose them.104 It also imposed extensive transparency and accountability requirements on fund recipients, with monitoring by a new
Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the Government
Accountability Office, and agency inspectors general.105 Eager to
encourage quick spending of stimulus funds, top administration
officials undertook unusual efforts to assist the states with administrative issues. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials
conducted weekly conference calls with representatives of state and
local government associations, and Vice President Biden’s office
assumed responsibility for resolving intergovernmental conflicts.106
Much of these Recovery Act funds were allocated based on
existing formulas, with some adjustment to take into account those
102. Conlan & Posner, supra note 6, at 428 (“FMAP funding was particularly fungible. The
principal rationale was to assist states with their growing Medicaid caseloads, which expand
during recessions as unemployed workers and their dependents become eligible for benefits.
By precluding the need for states to redirect resources from elsewhere in their budgets in
order to meet their Medicaid obligations, FMAP freed up state resources for other needs.”).
But see Alan Greenblatt, Federalism in the Age of Obama, ST. LEGISLATURES, July/August
2010, at 27-28 (arguing that MOE requirements for Medicaid and education funds
substantially limited state governments).
103. See NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note 99, at 2 (“The Secretary may waive or modify any
requirement related to maintaining fiscal effort for a state or school district .... The Secretary
may not approve a waiver for a state or school district that decreases the proportionate share
of total revenue that is available to elementary and secondary education.”); see also Conlan
& Posner, supra note 6, at 428-29 (noting MOE requirements and the need for many states
to seek clarification and waivers).
104. See, e.g., ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XI, 123 Stat. 115, 206 (2009).
105. See id. div. A, tit. XI, sec. 1512, 123 Stat. at 287 (guaranteeing GAO involvement and
instituting inspector general reviews); id. §§ 1521-1530, 123 Stat. at 289-94 (establishing the
Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board); see also Conlan & Posner, supra note 6,
at 429.
106. Conlan & Posner, supra note 6, at 430.
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states that were particularly hard hit by the recession.107 Yet some
funds were instead allocated competitively based on applications by
states and others, with the goal of encouraging greater innovation
in line with the administration’s policy priorities. Perhaps the most
notable of these efforts, and one that had a dramatic impact on the
states, was the Department of Education’s Race to the Top program.
Race to the Top was a competitive grant program involving $4.35
billion in Recovery Act funds, aimed at encouraging states to improve K-12 education in four core areas: teacher effectiveness and
equity in teacher distribution, data systems, standards and student
assessment, and lowest-performing schools.108 Under the program,
states submitted applications that were scored by outside experts
and then ranked, with only a certain number of top-ranked applications receiving funding. Points were awarded for specific state
measures, and states were not eligible to receive a grant if they prohibited linking student performance data to teacher and principal
assessment.109 Recognizing the central role that local education
agencies play, a high priority was put on ensuring that local
agencies were committed to the states’ proposed reforms.110
The net effect of Race to the Top was to spur significant changes
in state education laws across the country, with numerous states
overhauling teacher evaluation methods, lifting limits on charter
schools, and adopting common standards developed by the National
107. See id. at 429 (noting the Recovery Act’s reliance on established federal aid programs
as a means of efficient distribution); NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note 99, at 14-15 (noting the
extent that Medicaid funds are tied in part to state unemployment rates). In the case of the
Act’s education funding, for example, $39.5 billion of the $53.6 billion provided in State Fiscal
Stabilization Funds was distributed through existing state and federal formulas. See ARRA,
div. A, tit. XIV, sec. 14002,123 Stat. at 279-281; NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note 99, at 1.
108. These four areas were also central to the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund’s $48.6
billion in formula grants, with states being required to provide assurances that they would
adopt reforms in these areas and with distribution of the final third of these grants to states
being contingent on states providing publicly available data on their progress in these areas.
See State Fiscal Stabilization Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,837, 37,837-41 (July 29, 2009);
Johnson, supra note 99, at 178-79.
109. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-4 (2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
110. See id. at 4 (identifying LEA participation and commitment as an absolute priority for
grant awards); see also Sam Dillon, States Skeptical About ‘Race to Top’ School Aid Contest,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at A1 (“Officials from several states criticized the scoring of the
contest, which favored states able to gain support from 100 percent of school districts and
local teachers’ unions.”).
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Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School
Officers.111 The program caused some controversy: in addition to
teacher union protests, some states complained that the program
intruded too far on state control of education policy and was stacked
in favor of more urban eastern states, and civil rights groups
complained that a minimal amount of Race to the Top funds went
to minority children.112 Nonetheless, the administration views Race
to the Top as a substantial success and has proposed both continuing the program for school districts and using components of it as
a model for reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA), better known today as No Child Left
Behind.113
A particularly interesting feature of Race to the Top is the extent
to which the requirements for grant awards, and thus the instigation for state policy changes, were developed in the executive
branch. The Recovery Act reserved $5 billion for competitive grants
and an innovation fund and further stipulated four core areas for
111. See Stephanie Banchero & Neil King, Jr., Nine States, D.C. Win Race for Aid to
Schools, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, at A2; Sam Dillon, States Create a Flood of Education
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A14. But see Stephanie Banchero, Race to the Top Leaves
Some School Reformers Weary, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2010, at A6 (reporting complaints by
some school reformers that changes spurred by Race to the Top were not that significant).
112. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING
ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOL ACT 4 (2010), available at http://naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/
Framework%20for%20Providing%20All%20Students%20an%20Opportunity%20to%20Lea
rn%202.pdf (recommending that ESEA changes should include incentives for all states over
only a few); Dillon, supra note 111, at A14 (reporting state intrusion complaints from Texas,
Alaska, and Kansas, which refused to compete for grants); Sam Dillon, Eastern States
Dominate in Winning School Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at A3 (noting that other than
Hawaii, all of the twelve grant winners were states located east of the Mississippi River);
Gerry Shih, Educators Are Opposed to Obama’s School Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/education/06bceducation.html (reporting on opposition
to provisions in Race to the Top from the California Teachers Union and some California
education officials).
113. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2012, at 67 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
budget/fy2012/assets/budget.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6 (2010), available
at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/ blueprint.pdf (detailing new federal goals of
the ESEA, including building on Race to the Top’s success); see also Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y
of Educ., Remarks at the National Press Club (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/
news/speeches/quiet-revolution-secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-national-press-club
(describing failures of NCLB and detailing new innovation under the new administration).
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improvement.114 But the Act left the specifics of how funds were
allotted to the Secretary of Education’s discretion, with the Secretary expressly allowed to assess applications based on “such other
criteria as the Secretary determines appropriate, which may include
a State’s need for assistance.”115 As a result, the Department of
Education established the particular emphases of the program,
which led to many of the changes in state education laws116 and
reflected education policy goals of the Obama administration.117
Such executive branch discretion is a predictable result of greater
reliance on project or competitive grants to the states over formula grants.118 Despite the dominance of formula funding in the
Recovery Act, increased reliance on competitive and project grants
is a notable characteristic of state funding under the Obama administration—including much of the ACA’s non-Medicaid state grants
and the proposed ESEA Reauthorization in addition to Race to the
Top.119
Another notable characteristic—true not just of Race to the Top
but also of the Recovery Act generally—is the extent to which these
programs break open state governments. President Obama’s proposed budget recently highlighted Race to the Top’s emphasis on
localities by including $900 million in Race to the Top funds for local
114. See ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XIV, secs. 14001(c), 14005(c), 14006-14007,
123 Stat. 115, 279, 282-84 (2009).
115. Id. div. A, tit. XIV, sec. 14006(b), 123 Stat. at 283.
116. These emphases included the requirement that states were not eligible for Race to the
Top funds if they had prohibited linking student performance data to teacher and principal
assessment and the assignment of a large number of available points to states adopting
common standards, fostering charter schools, and reforming teacher and principal evaluation
and tenure systems. See Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688, 56,989-91 (Nov. 18, 2009);
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 109, at 7, 9, 11.
117. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Education Reform at the
National Urban League Centennial Conference (July 29, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-education-reform-national-urban-leaguecentennial-conference (terming Race to the Top the “most important thing” his administration
had done).
118. See Paul Manna, Education Stimulus Watch, Competitive Grant Making and
Education Reform: Assessing Race to the Top’s Current Impact and Future Prospects 4-5 (Am.
Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 5, 2010).
119. See Gais, supra note 6, at 12-13, 15; see also Johnson, supra note 99, at 176 & n.100
(detailing competitive and formula funds available under the Recovery Act for public housing
authorities and the administration’s changes in competitive grant criteria to respond to
complaints).
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school districts rather than states. This change would allow districts
like Houston to apply for grants notwithstanding the refusal of their
states to do so.120 The Recovery Act similarly targeted localities, at
times requiring that certain funds be granted to local governments.121 Even more striking, however, was the Act’s bypass provision, which authorizes state legislatures to overrule governors’
decisions to reject stimulus funds.122 To be sure, federal-local interactions are quite common, and localities play a central role in many
federal programs in areas as diverse as homeland security, transportation, and environmental protection as well as education.123 Yet
instances of the federal government authorizing localities or other
state-created entities to act in ways that violate state law are more
infrequent and more fraught from a federalism perspective, raising
concerns of federal commandeering of state institutions and undermining the integrity and sovereignty of state governments.124
Although the Court has recently signaled that such federal authorization of local violations of state law may raise federalism concerns,
in the past it has sustained federal power to preempt state-law
limits on actions by localities.125
120. Sam Dillon & Tamar Lewin, Obama Budget Raises School Spending and Keeps Pell
Grant Maximum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A19; see supra text accompanying note 113.
121. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. A prime example of this is the Recovery Act
provision that provided the basis for Race to the Top, which required that 50 percent of funds
go to local school districts. See ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XIV, sec. 14006(c), 123
Stat. 115, 284 (2009).
122. ARRA div. A, tit. XVI, sec. 1607(b), 123 Stat. at 303-04. Two states appear to have
overridden their governors’ refusal to accept stimulus funds: South Carolina and Alaska. See
Edwards v. State, 678 S.E.2d 412, 419-20 (S.C. 2009); Sean Cockerham, Legislature Overrides
Palin’s Stimulus Veto, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2009, http://www.adn.com/2009/
08/10/893955/legislature-overrides-palins-stimulus.html.
123. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 971-75 (2007) (listing examples).
124. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law To Free State
and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1206-25 (1999)
(noting and critiquing arguments against such federal authorization); see also D. Cody
Huffaker, Comment, A New Type of Commandeering: The Bypass Clause of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1055, 1057 (2010) (arguing that the
Recovery Act’s authorization of a state legislature to accept stimulus funds over a governor’s
opposition violates the anticommandeering doctrine).
125. Compare Nixon v. Miss. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140-41 (2004) (“[O]ur working
assumption [is] that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for
conducting their own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a way
that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power.”), with Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-

594

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:567

D. Preemption Under the Obama Administration
A final key federalism issue is preemption. Preemption was a
central federalism battleground during the Bush administration, in
large part due to efforts by administrative agencies to preempt state
tort suits.126 By contrast, the Obama administration has taken a
more restrictive approach to preemption. In an important early
move, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum emphasizing that agencies should preempt state law “only with full
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States[,] ... with
a sufficient legal basis for preemption” and if “justified under legal
principles governing preemption,” including the restrictions on
preemption imposed under Executive Order 13132.127 The Obama
administration further instructed agencies to cease including preemption statements in regulatory preambles that were not included
in codified regulations and to conduct a review of all regulations in
the last ten years that included preemptive statements and provisions to determine if preemption is justified under governing legal
principles.128 More recently, President Obama issued another memorandum instructing agencies to work closely with state, local, and
tribal governments to achieve greater administrative flexibility and
lower administrative burdens from federal requirements, directing
the OMB to lead the process.129
The Obama Preemption Memorandum appears to have had an
effect. A study that Catherine Sharkey conducted for the AdminisDeadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-I, 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985) (holding that state statute requiring
local governments to distribute federal payments in lieu of taxes in same way as general tax
revenues was preempted by federal statute authorizing such payments). See generally
Davidson, supra note 123, at 986-1000 (discussing tension between Nixon and prior
precedent); Hills, supra note 124, at 1207-16 (arguing that precedent does not support a
prohibition on such federal authorizations).
126. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2-3 (2011) (describing major preemption decisions from the 2008-09 term). In surveys, state
officials express frustration over perceived increases in federal preemption. See JOHN D.
NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING 37, 48 (2009) (listing opposition to preemption as second most common NGA
and NCSL policy statement).
127. Obama Preemption Memo, supra note 5, at 24, 693-94.
128. Id.
129. President Barack Obama, Government Reform for Competitiveness and Innovation,
76 Fed. Reg. 14,273, 14,273 (Mar. 11, 2011).
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trative Conference of the United States found that in a majority of
agencies surveyed, the Memorandum “led to serious internal
review.”130 Two agencies, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) in the Department of Transportation and
the independent Consumer Products Safety Commission, adopted
notably more cautious positions on preemption, with NHTSA going
so far as to remove preemptive language in a couple of earlier
rulemakings.131 In another early antipreemption move, in January
2009 President Obama directed the EPA to reconsider that agency’s
denial, under the Bush administration, of California’s request for a
Clean Air Act waiver to allow it to impose tighter greenhouse gas
emission restrictions on new cars.132 EPA subsequently granted the
California waiver and issued a finding that greenhouse gases
endanger public health and welfare; EPA also reached an agreement with the auto industry, the state of California, and other
stakeholders to impose the first national greenhouse gas emission
limits on cars and trucks.133 The Obama administration also took a
narrow approach to preemption in both the ACA and Dodd-Frank.
As noted, both measures limit preemption to state measures that
conflict with their requirements, and Dodd-Frank additionally
adopts procedural and evidentiary requirements to further restrict
130. CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, FEDERAL AGENCY PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 11 (2010),
available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/12/Sharkey_Draft_
ACUS_Report_2010_11_271.pdf.
131. Id. at 12-28, 45-53. The study found that the effect on the Food and Drug
Administration, another agency that undertook prominent efforts at administrative preemption during the Bush administration, was less clear, although many of the preemption efforts
of the OCC were addressed by Dodd-Frank. See id. at 12, 28-44.
132. See Memorandum, State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b),
the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 26, 2009) (directing, six days after President
Obama’s inauguration, the EPA Administrator to reassess the Bush administration’s decision
to deny California’s waiver request).
133. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. ch. I); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/endangerment.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Will
Propose Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles (May 2009),
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420f09028.pdf. California agreed to defer to the
national standards through 2016. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Grants
California GHG Waiver (June 30, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.
nsf/0/5E448236DE5FB369852575E500568E1B.
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the preemptive power of federal financial regulators.134 In making
clear that states can impose additional requirements, both measures
thus come down firmly on the side of federal law serving as a regulatory floor, rather than as a regulatory ceiling.135
The Obama administration’s preemption stance in court, however,
has been more equivocal. In some contexts, the administration has
reversed Bush era positions and taken an antipreemption stance.
Two examples are the administration’s opposition to preemption
from a federal vehicle safety standard and label restrictions for
generic drugs in cases before the Court last term.136 But the administration also urged preemption in other cases pending before the
Court, including a suit involving the Vaccine Act and one addressing
an Arizona measure targeting employment of illegal immigrants.137
Indeed, the administration has taken a strongly pro-preemption
position in the immigration context, filing suit in district court to
have another Arizonan immigration measure declared preempted.138
134. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 77-82.
135. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1585-99 (2007) (discussing floor/ceiling
distinction in preemption).
136. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-9,
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (No. 08-1314); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22-30, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993), 2011 WL 741927; see also Letter from Sharon Swingle,
Appellate Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit (Apr. 28, 2009) (withdrawing a previously submitted amicus brief supporting
preemption of state failure to warn claims based on drug labeling in Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009)). The Supreme Court agreed and rejected preemption in Williamson,
but upheld the claim of preemption in PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582.
137. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-9,
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152) [hereinafter Bruesewitz Amicus
Brief]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-10, Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115) [hereinafter Whiting
Amicus Brief]. Again, the administration had a 50 percent success rate with its preemption
arguments. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1987 (rejecting preemption); Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at
1082 (upholding preemption). Also worthy of note is the Obama administration’s opposition
to a suit brought by eight states challenging power plants’ greenhouse gas emissions as a
public nuisance, but that case focused displacement of federal common law nuisance claims
rather than preemption of state law. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527,
2537, 2540 (2011) (holding federal common law claims displaced and remanding for
consideration of whether state common law claims were preempted); Brief for the Tennessee
Valley Authority as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 3, 42-53, Am. Elec. Power Co., 131
S. Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174) [hereinafter TVA Brief] (addressing only federal common law issue).
138. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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Moreover, in that suit the administration asserted potentially broad
claims of federal exclusivity and field preemption and not simply
that the state measure at issue conflicted with federal laws and
administrative determinations.139
II. ASSESSING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S FEDERALISM RECORD
The measures just detailed represent major developments at
the national level, with the federal government in short order undertaking substantial new regulatory responsibilities and funding
commitments. These measures also stand out for the significant
effect they will have on the states and the relationship between
federal and state governments. Assessing their impact on federalism
is complicated by the numerous ways the states are incorporated
into the new federal regimes and the expanded power and funding
they can receive in return. Nonetheless, two key points emerge.
First, the central dynamic at play in these instances is not nation
versus state, but rather greater regulation versus more limited
government, along with broader disputes over substantive policy.
Federalism thus operates largely as a second-order concern. Second,
the broad powers these measures delegate underscore the importance of administrative federalism. Despite Congress’s central role
in enacting these measures, the administrative arena will be where
the metes and bounds of modern day federalism are determined.
Combined with recognition of the minimal protection the current
federalism doctrine offers the states, this suggests that the greatest
federalism benefits may lie in details of institutional design or nonfederalism-specific legal constraints, such as administrative law.

139. See, e.g., id. at 986, 991-92 (“The United States argues principally that the power to
regulate immigration is vested exclusively with the federal government, and the provisions
of S.B. 1070 are therefore preempted by federal law” and also that it “interferes and conflicts
with federal immigration law, foreign relations, and foreign policy.”); Brief for Appellee at 32,
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) [hereinafter Arizona
Appellee Brief] (arguing Arizona immigration law “substantially infringe[s] on the exclusive
federal regulation of immigration and the conditions placed on the presence of foreign
nationals in the United States”).
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A. Nation Versus State, or Activist Government Versus LaissezFaire?
Although the preemption restrictions that President Obama has
imposed are important, the clear trend of the developments discussed above is toward expansion of federal power. This trend is
perhaps most evident with respect to health care reform. To be sure,
the ACA was not the federal government’s first sortie into regulation of health care or health insurance; Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA,
and HIPAA are preexisting federal measures in these contexts.140
Even so, the ACA represents an expansion of federal regulation to
address issues previously left to state control, such as the reasonableness of premium increases or substantive coverage requirements for individual health insurance policies.141 Similarly, despite
already expansive federal financial regulation, Dodd-Frank also
extended the federal government’s reach to contexts, for instance
the sale of derivatives or executive compensation, in which it had
been largely absent. It also granted federal regulators new powers,
with the FDIC’s new liquidation authority over systemically
important financial institutions as a prime example.142 And the
140. See Leonard, supra note 34, at 143-44 (discussing ERISA and HIPAA); CATHERINE
HOFFMAN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
—A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS IN THE U.S. (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/upload/7871.pdf (providing history of Medicare and Medicaid as part of effort
to obtain national health insurance).
141. See Robert Pear, Health Insurers to Be Required To Justify Rate Increases over 10
Percent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A21 (describing new regulations on premium increases
as “a major expansion of federal authority in an area long regulated by states”); Amy B.
Monahan, Initial Thoughts on Essential Health Benefits 3-4 (Univ. of Minn. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-36, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646723 (“For the first time, the federal government is taking
the primary role in regulating the substance of health insurance coverage.”).
142. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, secs. 203-205, 124 Stat. 1376, 1450-58
(2010) (empowering the Treasury “to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a
significant risk to the financial stability of the United States”); id. secs. 721-754, 124 Stat.
1658-1754 (authorizing regulation of derivatives and other “swap markets”); id. secs. 951-957,
124 Stat. 1899-1907 (requiring new executive compensation regulation); see also Damian
Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2010, at A1 (calling Dodd-Frank “the biggest expansion of government power over banking
and markets since the Depression,” including “expansive new authority over derivatives”);
Edward Wyatt, A Scale-Back Is Possible in Financial Overhaul Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
at B4 (noting SEC’s “100 [new] rulemaking provisions” and CFTC’s “30 broad areas of new
rulemaking”).
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Recovery Act’s additional federal funding for states came with new
conditions and strings attached.143
Yet it is also clear that these measures do not represent a pure
assertion of federal power at the expense of the states. Instead, a
striking feature of all of these reforms is the extent to which the
states are offered central roles to play in the new federal regimes,
with broad grants of authority and federal funds to entice their
participation. Abbe Gluck has recently described the variety of roles
for the states evident in the ACA, with some provisions authorizing
either exclusive federal or exclusive state control and others
representing an amalgam of cooperative or parallel federal and
state responsibilities.144 Dodd-Frank also constitutes a significant
expansion of state regulatory authority, with states granted power
to enforce new federal requirements and also enjoying broadened
authority to enforce state law against national banks.145 The
Recovery Act is a prime example of this dual federal- and stateenhancing character: the vast majority of state funds were made
available under preexisting formulas with the states being allowed
a fair amount of flexibility in spending at the same time as the
government also expanded its use of competitive project grants to
change state programs.
Moreover, these new federal measures also appear to preserve a
good deal of room for state innovation and regulatory flexibility.
Under the ACA, states have discretion over key issues such as how
health exchanges will operate, whether they will impose additional
requirements on insurers, and, through NAIC, the criteria for premium increases and rebates.146 States can also seek waivers to
143. See supra notes 101-05, 121 (describing conditions on federal funds in Recovery Act);
infra text accompanying notes 223-26 (discussing general constitutionality of conditional
federal funding).
144. See Gluck, supra note 43, at 34-35 (discussing “parallel federalism” in ACA provisions
regarding temporary high-risk pools and health insurance exchanges).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 76-87.
146. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119, 136-37 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18) (allowing states to regulate rebate percentages); id. sec.
1201, § 2701, 124 Stat. at 155-56 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 300gg) (allowing states to
regulate rating areas for premium increases); id. secs. 1321-1324, 124 Stat. at 186-199
(providing flexibility to states in operation of exchanges); id. sec. 1323(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 19294 (allowing states to require additional benefits); see also supra notes 51-62 and
accompanying text (describing areas of state flexibility and control in the ACA).
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operate programs that deviate from the ACA’s requirements.147 In
the financial context, Dodd-Frank allows states to impose greater
consumer protections without fear of federal preemption and to
enforce federal requirements.148 Although Race to the Top created
a strong incentive for states to adopt particular reforms of their
education systems, such as common assessment standards and
teacher performance accountability, even here states had flexibility
over how to incorporate the new features into their K-12 programs.149
Why these federal initiatives give the states such central responsibilities is an interesting question, and several factors are
likely at work. One is the fact that the areas addressed—health
insurance, consumer protection, and education—are traditional
areas of state authority and control.150 As a result, states already
have extensive experience and expertise in these areas plus existing
administrative structures that could be used to implement new
regulatory programs and requirements. Moreover, in areas like
health and education, prior federal interventions have often taken
the form of cooperative federal-state programs.151 To some degree,
147. See ACA sec. 1332, 124 Stat. at 203-06 (allowing states to apply to the Secretary of
HHS for a waiver of certain ACA provisions).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
150. Insurance was left for state control under McCarran-Ferguson even after the Court
held insurance fell within the scope of the Commerce Clause power. See McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006) (providing exclusive power to regulate and tax “the
business of insurance” to states); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 42731 (1946) (upholding state regulation of insurance, post-McCarran-Ferguson); United States
v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944) (holding that the federal government
may regulate insurance under its Commerce Clause power), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No.
79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945). Similarly, states have long played a central role in consumer
protection through state tort law, statutes, and enforcement actions by state attorneys
general. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW §§ 2-7 (detailing the state
role in consumer protection law). The states’ centrality in education is often acknowledged.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that education is an area
“where States historically have been sovereign”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974)
(“No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools.”).
151. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006) (requiring states to submit
plans to improve education but allowing flexibility in details of education standards); 42
U.S.C. §§ 1397bb-1397gg (2006) (requiring a general state child health plan for states to
receive federal funds under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program but allowing
flexibility in implementation); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7416 (2006) (requiring states
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then, the new federal initiatives followed a familiar and expected
administrative structure in their reliance on the states, though the
extent of authority delegated and some of the responsibilities
assigned are still unusual.152 Reliance on the states also served to
deflect political opposition from state government organizations
anxious about displacement of state authority.153 Indeed, that the
expansions in state responsibilities occurred during the legislative
debate over the ACA and Dodd-Frank suggests that the roles given
to the states were important to the ultimate passage of both
measures.154 In addition, delegating to the states provided a mechanism to foster experimentation in policies and implementation, a
traditional justification for federalism that also underlies arguments
for restrictions on preemption.155
to submit implementation plans but retaining state authority to regulate emissions and air
pollution).
152. For example, in several instances the ACA assigns primary regulatory and
enforcement responsibilities to NAIC and the states, with HHS accorded a secondary role.
See, e.g., ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001, §§ 2711-2719, 124 Stat. 119, 130-38 (2010)
(amending the Public Health Services Act), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, sec. 2301(b), 124 Stat. 1029, 1081-82 (2010) (striking
“who is not married”); ACA sec. 10101, § 2718(c), 124 Stat. at 887 (amending the Public
Health Services Act and authorizing NAIC to issue definitions of what counts as medical
services); ACA sec. 1003, § 2794, 124 Stat. at 139 (amending the Public Health Services Act,
which provided for concomitant review of premium increases by states and the Secretary of
HHS and required state approval of increases when authorized by state law); ACA sec. 1311,
124 Stat. at 173 (creating health benefit exchanges to be implemented by the states unless
the Secretary determines state implementation is inadequate). The states’ power to force the
Consumers Bureau to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking is also a new innovation. See
supra text accompanying note 86; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 4 (2010) (terming it “apparently unique”).
153. STANDING COMM. ON COMMC’NS, FIN. SERVS. & INTERSTATE COMMERCE, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT: STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES, available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/sccomfc/State
SovereigntyAM.pdf.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43, 95.
155. For identification of ACA and Race to the Top in experimentalist terms, see JULIETTE
FORESTENZER ESPINOSA, ACADEMYHEALTH, REIMAGINING FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES FOR
HEALTH REFORM UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1, 5 (2010),
available at http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/ResInsightsReformRoles.pdf;
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 32), available at http://www2.
law.columbia.edu/sabel/Min.2.3.docx (describing Race to the Top as an example of the
“incentive design” variation of experimentalist governance); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a

602

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:567

Equally important was the recent history of the states as progressive policy reformers. During the Bush administration, progressive
regulatory and enforcement initiatives occurred largely at the state
and local level.156 For example, Massachusetts’s 2006 reform
provided a forerunner to the ACA’s approach of relying on private
health insurance, health exchanges, an individual coverage mandate, subsidies, and substantive insurance regulation.157 States were
also more aggressive at addressing financial sector abuses and
global warming, often in the face of federal resistance.158 The effect
was to transform many advocates of progressive policies and more
aggressive regulation into defenders of state prerogatives.159 This
defense of state regulation is most clearly evident in the new limits
on preemption but also seems likely to have contributed to a greater
willingness to have states play key implementation roles in federal
regulatory schemes. The fact that many Cabinet officers and highlevel officials in the Obama administration came directly from jobs
in state government may also have contributed to their willingness
to delegate broad responsibilities to the states.160

laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130
(2004) (“The whole point of preemption is generally to force national uniformity on a
particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and experimentation.”).
156. See David J. Barron, Foreword, Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 1-2 (2009); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New
Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 33-34, 40-51 (2009).
157. See Stephen M. Weiner, Payment Reform After PPACA: Is Massachusetts Leading the
Way Again?, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 33, 33 & n.3 (2011).
158. See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A
Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 60 (2005) (noting “the multitude of greenhouse
gas reduction activities occurring on the state and local level”); Schapiro, supra note 156, at
40-43; Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 76, at 3, 19-22, 26.
159. See Schapiro, supra note 156, at 33 (arguing the “trend of state-level reform represents
a kind of return to the early Progressive movement ... when state-sponsored programs
constituted the core of the Progressive agenda”); see also Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the
Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1277, 1277-78, 1302-08 (2004) (noting and encouraging such a move by liberals toward
the states in response to the Bush administration’s national security policies).
160. For example, prior to joining the Obama administration, seven of the sixteen members
of President Obama’s cabinet were former state governors or high-level state and local
officials: Shaun Donovan, Arne Duncan, Gary Locke, Janet Napolitano, Kathleen Sebelius,
Ken Salazar, and Tom Vilsack. See The New Team, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/
44th_president/new_team/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
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Whatever the reason, the central roles the states play mean that
portraying these new federal measures as a zero-sum contest that
the national government won and the states lost is false. Several
scholars have argued that conceptualizing federalism in zero-sum
terms, with the states and the federal government fighting over who
gets to exercise authority in any given area, fundamentally misunderstands the overlapping and negotiated character of contemporary federal-state relations.161 The recent initiatives demonstrate
this point, as their central characteristic is expanded authority at
both the national and state levels. For many states the measures
are empowering, granting them the authority and resources they
need to undertake more effective reform and more aggressive enforcement. Perhaps as important, the imposition of minimum federal requirements protects states from having their regulatory
initiatives undermined by interstate mobility and other states’ more
limited oversight.162 Undoubtedly, for those states that would prefer
not to participate in the new federal initiatives, such as states that
oppose the Medicaid expansion or assessing teachers based on
student performance, the story is quite different. But the constraints these states feel is more a result of their disagreement with
the administration’s substantive policies and their reluctance to
assume the new governance responsibilities being offered than an

161. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (emphasizing that federalism today means concurrent and
overlapping authority); Ryan, supra note 97, at 3-6 (arguing that federalism is best
understood as an iterative process of negotiated bargaining between state and federal actors).
162. Substantial literature exists on the question of whether interstate mobility and state
variation leads to a regulatory race to the bottom. Compare, e.g., Richard J. Revesz, The Race
to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV.
535, 538-40 (1997) (discussing the logic of why “race-to-the-bottom justification” for
centralized federal environmental regulation is unpersuasive), with Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 271, 351-54 (1997) (arguing that empirical evidence “provide[s] prima facie evidence that
states are indeed engaged in a race-to-the-bottom”). Interstate mobility and the ability of
insurers to leave a state’s individual policy market undermined earlier state efforts to prohibit
health insurers from discriminating against preexisting conditions. See, e.g., Amicus Brief on
Behalf of the Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania in Support of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 10-CV-91-RV-EMT)
(describing the “‘death spiral’ that can occur in the insurance market when coverage for
preexisting conditions is required without universal coverage”).
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inherent characterization of these initiatives as assertions of
national power.163
Indeed, the central dynamic evident in these initiatives is not
nation versus state but instead greater governmental intervention
versus laissez-faire reliance on the market. The ACA and DoddFrank stand as testaments to the belief that the government needs
to play a more active regulatory role and the powers granted to
states are geared to producing greater oversight of the health insurance market and the financial sector. The ACA encourages greater
state regulation by mandating direct federal implementation if
state efforts prove inadequate, whereas Dodd-Frank creates a
federal regulatory floor but protects states’ abilities to impose
additional requirements.164 The limits placed on administrative preemption, and administrative moves such as the approval of California’s request to regulate greenhouse gas auto emissions,165 are of a
piece with this overall activist government stance. The stimulus
measure as a whole similarly reflects this thrust toward more
activist government, as it represented a massive fiscal intervention
in hopes of sparking economic recovery.166 The substantial increase
in state Medicaid rolls is yet another example of an expanded
governmental role.167 Not surprisingly, therefore, the federalism
dimension of the administration’s initiatives has accrued more to
the benefit of states desirous of playing an activist role than states
that prefer a more antiregulatory approach.
To be sure, this pro-regulatory emphasis is not universal. The
Obama administration will not support every effort by states to play
a greater regulatory role, as demonstrated by its effort to prohibit
Arizona from undertaking additional immigration enforcement.168
Nor does the pro-regulatory-antiregulatory divide map as well in the
163. Support for this view comes from the Florida ACA litigation. There, although twentysix states challenged the Medicaid expansion as coercive, another five states filed an amicus
brief rejecting that characterization and asserting that the expansion would lower their
healthcare costs. See Brief of the States of Oregon, Iowa, Vermont, Maryland, and Kentucky
as Amici Curiae at 2, McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 10-CV-91-RV-EMT) (“Absent
national reform, state-level health care costs will rise dramatically over the next 10 years.”).
164. See supra notes 80, 92-94, 135 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
168. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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education context, in which one goal of Race to the Top was to
encourage states to repeal existing regulations viewed as inhibiting
educational improvement. Moreover, a lack of federal action need
not mean similar regulatory quietude on the part of the states; far
from it. During the Bush administration many states sought to fill
the regulatory gaps that federal inaction created, and some states
continue to push greater state regulation on issues that are not
being addressed—or they believe are not being addressed adequately—at the federal level.169 Nonetheless, the overwhelming
thrust of federalism under the Obama administration, as these four
initiatives reveal, has been toward encouraging greater state regulatory efforts.
Put slightly differently, the federalism-supportive features of
these initiatives are inextricably linked to the administration’s
progressive policy goals and activist government stance.170 Most
obviously, assigning the states a significant role was at times
strategically necessary to secure passage of these initiatives.171 But
the connection to the administration’s political agenda went deeper.
Empowering the states provided a mechanism for enhanced enforcement and regulatory oversight in line with the administration’s policy. The administration’s resistance to independent
state efforts on immigration also showcases this point, as this resistance appears driven in part by concerns that such state efforts
will lead to discrimination and harassment of lawfully present
aliens as well as undermine the administration’s immigration
policy.172 Incorporating the states also creates the potential for
greater policy entrenchment over time as state officials become
169. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57; see also Vivian E. Thompson & Vicki
Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the States,
29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6-10 (2011) (describing past and ongoing state efforts to lower
greenhouse gas emissions).
170. See Greenblatt, supra note 102, at 28 (“Washington needs states to carry out its grand
visions on the ground, but the administration also fully intends to give them numerous pushes
in its preferred direction.”).
171. See supra notes 43, 95 and accompanying text.
172. See Whiting Amicus Brief, supra note 137, at 17-18; Arizona Appellee Brief, supra note
139, at 24-29, 30-34, 37-39. Correspondingly, the administration has also limited local
governments’ immigration enforcement authority under agreements with the federal
government in response to concerns about overly aggressive enforcement. See Ryan, supra
note 97, at 34-35.
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more invested in the new federal programs.173 Moreover, in the
current political climate, relying on the states may provide the
administration with an avenue for pushing its policy agenda despite
increased resistance to aggressive regulatory enforcement at the
federal level.174
Such reliance on the states also comes with policy risks, in particular the possibility that resistance at the state level may
undermine successful implementation of the new policies.175 But
that risk is mitigated to some degree by two features of these
initiatives: first, that implementation of the new policies is a
required condition of substantial federal funding and, second, that
the federal government is authorized to step in and replace
underperforming states.176 Moreover, the federal government may
not face the same practical obstacles to taking over implementation
in the health insurance context as it sometimes has encountered
in other areas.177 It not only already has substantial experience
173. See Gluck, supra note 43, at 36-38 (identifying this entrenching dynamic in the context
of the ACA); see also supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. In the terms of positive
political theory, incorporating states in federal programs and federal administration thus
appears as a structural protection against legislative and bureaucratic drift. See generally
McNollgast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
174. See Wyatt, supra note 142, at B4 (noting Republican opposition to and delay of DoddFrank provisions).
175. See Kevin Sack, Republicans Rise to Power, with Enmity for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2010, at A13 (“The tectonic movement in state politics across the country after the
Nov. 2 election has left the health care law in hostile hands in many places, just as
responsibility for carrying out the law begins to fall most heavily on the states.”). Such
resistance has occurred in the past in other contexts. See NUGENT, supra note 126, at 65-67,
193-200 (noting state resistance to implementing federal education requirements and
REAL ID); Denise Scheberle, The Evolving Matrix of Environmental Federalism and
Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 PUBLIUS 69, 77 (2005) (noting examples of states
“challenging the EPA’s ability to enforce tighter standards under the Clean Air Act”).
176. In some instances, however, HHS’s ability to enforce ACA’s requirements when a state
has failed to do so is not clear. Concern that HHS lacks power to enforce ACA’s limitations
on unreasonable premium increases has led to proposals for enhanced HHS authority. See
Health Insurance Rate Authority Act of 2011, S. 3078, 111th Cong. § 2 (2011) (proposing the
establishment of a Health Insurance Rate Authority and centralized authority for HHS to
review and correct unreasonable premium increases); Ann Mills, Carolyn L. Engelhard &
Patricia M. Tereskerz, Truth and Consequences—Insurance-Premium Rate Regulation and
the ACA, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 899, 900 (2010) (noting a “lack of regulatory teeth in the
ACA” and supporting additional powers for HHS in premium increase regulation).
177. See NUGENT, supra note 126, at 172-78 (arguing that federal officials’ dependence on
state implementers often means they lack ability to sanction state noncompliance); DENISE
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running the Federal Employees’ Health Benefits program,178 the
military’s TRICARE system,179 as well as Medicare, but also can use
the same health exchange model in a number of states.180
The question remains, however, whether these measures represent federalism. Some might dispute that description, arguing
that the very fact that states must adhere to an overall policy
agenda emanating from Washington precludes understanding these
measures in federalism terms. Others might view these initiatives
more as decentralized programmatic implementation than federalism, given that the scope of the states’ authority is set by federal
statute and the presence of federal minimum standards to which
they must adhere.181 Underlying these arguments is an insistence
on federalism as necessitating freedom on the part of the states to
pursue policies of their own choosing, even at—perhaps especially
at—the expense of national goals.182
But demanding such policy or enforcement independence represents too narrow a definition of federalism. To begin with, broad
federal power is a given of our national modern administrative
state, one that the Supreme Court may tinker with at the edges but
is not going to fundamentally alter.183 As a result, equating federalism with independence from national policy would render it largely
irrelevant in a vast array of governance contexts. In addition, such
a definition is not constitutionally mandated.184 Indeed, although
SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF
IMPLEMENTATION 187-88 (1997) (noting that the federal government lacks the fiscal or
organizational capacity to take over responsibility for state-level environmental
implementation); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544
(1994) (“Realistically speaking, Congress can neither abandon these programs nor ‘fire’ the
states and have federal bureaucrats assume full responsibility for them.”).
178. See Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890 (2011).
179. See TRICARE Program, 32 C.F.R. § 199.17 (2011).
180. Gluck, supra note 43, at 40 (“Running insurance exchanges in a small number of
states will enable the federal government to build expertise in this area of traditional state
control.”).
181. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11, at 910-14 (distinguishing federalism and
decentralization).
182. Id. at 913 (“[F]ederalism ... is the right of states to act independently, in furtherance
of goals the national government does not share.”).
183. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J.
2023, 2048 (2008) (emphasizing “the Court's unwillingness to curb congressional regulatory
authority on constitutional federalism grounds”).
184. Scholars have recently articulated accounts of federalism that emphasize concurrent
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the Court has at times identified federalism with state independence, it has also sanctioned federal-state cooperation and treated
federalism as a more general value to be applied within federal
regulatory schemes, and not simply to set these schemes’ boundaries.185 Nor does a definition of federalism in terms of independence
accord with our lived experience, which is dominated by federalism
in the form of negotiated, cooperative, and sometimes uncooperative
federal-state relationships.186 Lastly, although characterizing initiatives like the ACA as decentralized administration is certainly
plausible, viewing them solely in decentralization terms misses an
important part of the story. In particular, pressure to ensure a role
for the states per se is a main reason why these initiatives have a
decentralized form and were enacted at all.187
An alternative approach, one I find more appealing, sees federalism as encompassing instances in which state authority and state
authority, multilevel empowerment, and shared problem solving capacity. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008);
SCHAPIRO, supra note 161; Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks
and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007); see also Gillian
E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Free Standing Federalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
F. 98 (2009) (defending extrapolation of broad constitutional federalism principles and
values). For a contrary view of constitutional federalism as encompassing solely the specific
federal-state compromises incorporated into the Constitution, see John F. Manning,
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV.
2003, 2040 (2009).
185. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295-96
(2006) (applying a federalism-based clear statement rule to determine state obligations as a
result of participation in federal programs); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-68
(1992) (emphasizing the importance of federal and state governments’ independent
relationships with individuals and therefore condemning federal commandeering of state
legislatures while upholding federal spending conditions on the states).
186. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1271-84 (2009) (describing instances of state resistance from within federal
programs); Ryan, supra note 97, at 24-73 (identifying ways in which state and federal actors
bargain over collaborative governance); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665, 668-73 (2001) (emphasizing
the political reality of cooperative federalism). Identification of federalism in these
partnership terms is of longstanding duration, with the classic exposition being DANIEL J.
ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 2, 51-80 (3d ed. 1984).
187. See supra notes 43, 82, 95, 101 and accompanying text; see also Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 381-82 (1997) (noting states are a fundamental
aspect of American federalism and that “we do not now have a choice between the federalism
we have and a system of unitary national authority, with the latter having the option to
decentralize when it makes sense”).
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interests surface within federal administration.188 On this account,
whether the Obama initiatives actually represent instances of
federalism will depend on whether states are granted meaningful
authority over the content of the programs they administer or
instead have their discretion substantially limited. This view of
federalism lacks clear lines and risks obscuring substantial inroads
on state authority in a wealth of programmatic detail. It may also
raise concerns about confused accountability and the extent to
which states will be able to serve federalism’s oft-invoked benefit of
checking federal overreaching—although a strong case can be made
that states may have their greatest influence on the shape of federal
policy when arguing from within.189 These issues are unavoidable,
however, once we acknowledge that the intermingling of federal and
state authority is a basic feature of federalism in the context of
modern governance.
The Obama administration experience thus demonstrates that
federalism can be alive and well in a context of expanding national
regulation. But this experience also lends support to the skeptical
view that “federalism is destined to be a second order concern.”190
Even if qualifying as instances of federalism, the measures described here represent deployment of federalism to achieve progressive policy goals rather than “as a principled end in and of itself.”191
Nor is federalism’s second-order status unique to liberals and
progressives; conservative support for federalism is often just as
instrumental.192
188. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 183, at 2047-2109 (describing ways in which
administrative structure and administrative law can serve as federalism surrogates by
protecting state interests in the context of federal agency decision making); see also Metzger,
supra note 126, at 67-75 (describing use of states and federalism to police federal
administration).
189. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 186, at 1265-71, 1285-92; see also Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (listing greater governmental diversity, citizen
involvement, innovation and experimentation, responsiveness, and protection against
governmental “tyranny and abuse” as federalism’s benefits).
190. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J.
345, 353 n.38 (2008); Devins, supra note 11, at 137; see also Cross, supra note 11, at 1307-12
(noting that federalism is most often deployed derivatively to achieve some other ideological
end).
191. Cross, supra note 11, at 1307.
192. For recent prominent examples of how conservatives’ traditional support for the states
is contingent on substantive policy, note the Bush administration’s aggressive preemption
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Yet the Obama administration’s record also suggests that
federalism’s second-order status should not be a cause for alarm for
advocates of a greater state role. It indicates that progressives’
discovery of the policy potential of state and local governments was
not simply an opposition strategy to be cast aside once they came
into control of the national government.193 Despite their early
twentieth century emphasis on state government as an engine of
reform, the New Deal progressives became far more resistant to
federalism and assertions of state power, a resistance that was
reinforced when federalism and states’ rights became a mantra for
protection of segregation and race discrimination.194 To the extent
progressives’ commitment to the states has staying power, it represents a potential new force for federalist approaches at the
national level.195 At a minimum, the fact that the ACA and DoddFrank both became more friendly to state interests as they worked
their way through Congress reinforces claims that the political
safeguards of federalism can have real effect.196
B. The Central Importance of Administrative Federalism
A consistent theme runs through all four of the federalism
measures listed above: the critical importance of federal administrative agencies in determining the terms of state involvement and
extent of state authority. For example, HHS must issue regulations
specifying standards for how health exchanges can operate and
determining what counts as not taking sufficient action toward
establishing an exchange such that the federal government must
take over implementation; the CFPB and the OCC are expressly
efforts, see Metzger, supra note 126, at 2, 20, and conservative advocacy of a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage in response to state authorization, see Shailagh
Murray, Gay Marriage Amendment Fails in the Senate, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/AR2006060700830. html.
193. See Barron, supra note 156, at 4-7 (discussing the danger that progressives’ ascension
to power at the national level might undermine their commitment to federalism and
decentralization).
194. See Schapiro, supra note 156, at 34.
195. See Young, supra note 159, at 1308-11 (discussing the possibility that some liberals
fear to embrace federalism at the chance of appearing opportunistic).
196. For discussion and other contemporary examples of the political leverage states can
wield, see NUGENT, supra note 126, at 115-67.
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granted power to preempt state consumer protection laws, albeit
under restrictive standards, and the states are to consult with the
CFPB before bringing suit to enforce its regulations; and the
Department of Education had broad authority to determine the
criteria on which state applications for Race to the Top funds would
be assessed and the weight assigned to factors like teacher performance accountability. Moreover, these agencies’ power to set the
terms of state involvement are only one manifestation of their
responsibilities in implementing these measures, many others of
which will likely have a significant impact on the states.197
No doubt, the fact that these statutes on their face incorporate a
substantial role for the states matters for how agencies structure
state responsibilities and precludes administrative efforts to preempt state authority of the kind that typified the Bush administration.198 Even so, the broad powers and responsibilities delegated
to federal agencies mean that it will be these agencies, along with
their executive branch overseers, who determine whether these
measures realize their state-empowering potential. The Obama
initiatives thus reinforce the view that administrative agencies are
the critical arena for determining the shape of federal-state
relations. Recently, a number of federalism scholars have argued
further that administrative agencies represent a potentially
powerful mechanism for protecting state interests.199 The new

197. To give an illustration from the ACA, noted above, see supra text accompanying notes
50-55. HHS is charged with determining what counts as essential benefits that health plans
must cover as well as the criteria for triggering review of unreasonable premium rate
increases, determinations that the state will implement through their decisions about
whether a plan can participate in an exchange and through their review of insurers. These
determinations will also affect states’ abilities to mandate additional benefits, as states will
have to cover the cost of such additional mandates for participants in an exchange. See ACA,
Pub. L. No. 111-148 sec. 1003, 124 Stat. 119, 139 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2794)
(providing for premium rate review by the states and HHS); see also id. secs. 1302(b), 1311,
1321, 124 Stat. at 163-65, 173-81, 186-87 (regarding structure of exchanges).
198. See Metzger, supra note 126, at 20.
199. See Metzger, supra note 183, at 2072-91; see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note
186, at 1292 (discussing the “administrative safeguards of federalism”); Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the
Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1939, 1948-83 (2008) (arguing that “for the most
part, agencies outperform” other federal branches as allocators of policysetting power);
SHARKEY, supra note 130, at 49-55 (defending agencies as at least potentially attentive to
state interests).
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measures provide an opportunity to test whether that claim holds
up in practice and to study the extent to which features such as
presidential involvement or congressional oversight prove important
in determining agency receptivity to state concerns.200
So far, states have fared relatively well in the administrative
arena under President Obama. Perhaps the clearest evidence of
increased sensitivity to state interests is the President’s Preemption
Memo and resultant pullback in administrative preemption.201
Moreover, the record to date suggests some effort by agencies to
allow the states substantial flexibility and actively incorporate
them into the new federal regulatory schemes. In particular, HHS
deferred substantially to NAIC on some issues, such as setting
medical-loss ratios and the process for rate review, and has also
proposed allowing states to choose between more active and more
minimalist approaches to running the health exchanges.202 HHS has
granted numerous waivers of the ACA’s requirements to both states
and private entities.203 It has also signaled a willingness to work
with states that are not ready to operate an exchange by the statutory deadline of January 1, 2013, proposing the possibility of
conditional approval and allowing states to seek to take over
federally-operated exchanges.204 Also notable are Elizabeth Warren’s
efforts to foster a strong relationship between the CFPB and state
attorneys general.205 On the education front, the Department of
Education has signaled its willingness to waive accountability
requirements of No Child Left Behind that have triggered strong
state resistance if Congress does not address the issue, though such
200. For a recent analysis of the role the President plays in shaping administrative
preemption, see Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 339 (2010).
201. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
202. See Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note 40, at 41,867, 41,891-92 (proposed July 15,
2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155-156) (“The intent of this proposed rule is to allow
the States substantial discretion in the design and operation of an Exchange.”); Medical Loss
Ratio Interim Final Rule, supra note 56, 75 Fed. Reg. at 74,866 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158) (“This interim final regulation certifies and adopts the NAIC’s model
regulation in full.”).
203. See Robert Pear, Making Exceptions in Obama’s Health Care Act Draws Kudos, and
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, at A21 (noting 94 percent of waiver applications have
been granted).
204. See Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note 40, at 41,871-72.
205. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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waivers would be contingent on states’ agreeing to federal policy
priorities as in Race to the Top.206
To be sure, this administrative responsiveness to the states has
limits. HHS has so far resisted Republican governors’ calls to waive
the Medicaid maintenance of effort requirements in light of state
budget deficits,207 and at least one state organization has complained about being sidelined from FSOC deliberations.208 In
addition, such administrative responsiveness is no doubt fueled in
part by political realities: this is hardly a juncture in which HHS
wants to foster greater state resistance to the ACA by taking an
unduly restrictive approach to state enforcement, and state AGs
may represent the best chance for aggressive consumer protection
enforcement in the face of congressional Republican opposition to
Dodd-Frank.209 Further, despite being structured as an optional
program under which states could propose different approaches,
Race to the Top was more directive of the states, with states having
to adopt certain reforms to have a realistic chance of winning a
grant. Again, therefore, agencies’ commitment to federalism appears
at least derivative of the Obama administration’s underlying policy
goals. Yet the states may still have real and lasting influence, to the
extent agency officials see them as crucial partners in achieving
progressive aims.210 The presence of former elected state officials in
high-level agency positions, in particular former Kansas Governor
and Insurance Commissioner Kathleen Sebelius as Secretary of
HHS, may also lead to greater administrative attentiveness to some
state concerns.211
206. See Sam Dillon, Education Secretary May Agree to Waivers on ‘No Child’ Law
Requirements, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2011, at A25.
207. Robert Pear, Governors Get Advice for Saving on Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011,
at A11.
208. See Letter from Susan E. Voss, NAIC President, to Timothy Geithner, U.S. Sec’y of
the Treasury (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_letter_
110209_fsoc_geithner.pdf.
209. See Wyatt, supra note 142, at B4.
210. See NUGENT, supra note 126, at 117; Metzger, supra note 183, at 2075 (describing the
many ties that give states leverage in federal decision making); see also Bulman-Pozen &
Gerken, supra note 186, at 1263 (explaining that the states’ role as federal servants also
allows the states to challenge federal government).
211. See Kathleen Sebelius & Ned Sebelius, Bearing the Burden of the Beltway: Practical
Realities of State Government and Federal-State Relations in the Twenty-First Century, 3
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 9 (2009) (considering the practical realities of state-federal interaction
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Moreover, a striking feature of the recent federalism initiatives
is their use of structural mechanisms that give state officials a
direct role in federal administrative decisionmaking and potentially
limit agencies’ abilities to prevent state involvement. Perhaps the
most unusual are the provisions in Dodd-Frank for state financial
regulators to serve as non-voting members on the new FSOC212 and,
in addition, requiring that the CFPB issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on a proposed consumer protection standard if a majority of
states pass a resolution supporting the measure.213 Also notable is
Dodd-Frank’s express grant of power to the states to enforce the
CFPB’s regulations; although the states are precluded from enforcing the statute directly, this provision gives them some independent authority over federal consumer financial protection
requirements.214 To similar effect is the ACA’s grant of primary
responsibility to set the terms of medical-loss ratios to NAIC, an
association of state insurance officials. Other examples are the
Obama Preemption Memo’s specific instruction that agencies undertake a ten-year review of preemptive regulations and its reinforcement of Executive Order 13132, a long-standing order that imposes
certain requirements and procedures on federal agencies when they
are taking actions that affect state interests.215 President Obama’s
directive instructing OMB to lead an administration-wide process
of consulting with states and localities and streamlining their
regulatory burdens is simply the most recent instance in which
states were formally incorporated into the regulatory process.216
Additionally, the administration has employed a number of informal
mechanisms aimed at ensuring coordination and communication
between federal and state officials, such as OMB’s ad hoc committee
to oversee implementation of the federal stimulus.217
and recommending new approaches for state flexibility and creativity).
212. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
213. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
214. For discussion of state enforcement of federal law, see generally Margaret H. Lemos,
State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011).
215. Obama Preemption Memo, supra note 5, at 24,693, 24,693-94; see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2156-57
(2009).
216. See supra text accompanying note 131.
217. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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It remains to be seen how effective these mechanisms will be in
protecting state interests, but they represent potentially significant
means for incorporating federalism into the administrative level.218
A particularly interesting aspect of these mechanisms is that they
provide a means by which states not only can assert their own
interests in the administrative arena, but further can directly police
federal agency performance. A comparison of the state-supportive
mechanisms in the ACA and Dodd-Frank highlights this feature.
The ACA mechanisms, such as the incorporation of NAIC and
reliance on states to implement health exchanges and review
insurance rates, appear primarily focused on providing a sphere for
state discretion and benefitting from preexisting state expertise. By
contrast, the mechanisms in Dodd-Frank, in particular the states’
ability to prod action from the CFPB and independently enforce the
CFPB’s regulations, appear more centered on using the states to
guard against federal agency failure. This difference in focus likely
reflects the fact that ACA represents an expansion of the federal
government’s role into areas previously left to the states, whereas
Dodd-Frank represents an effort to strengthen existing federal
financial regulation against a background in which states had
proved the more energetic prosecutors. A similar effort to empower
states to guard against federal agency failure is evident in other
recent legislation and in the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.219 Such recognition that the states can play a role in policing
218. These mechanisms accord with recent scholarship in both the administrative law and
federalism arenas that has focused on the importance of institutional design in controlling
agency behavior and interagency interactions. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Jody
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012); Sharkey, supra note 215, at 2172-73.
219. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314,
secs. 207, 218, 122 Stat. 3016, 3044-46, 3060-62 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (allowing sharing of information with state agencies and allowing state attorneys
general to bring suit to enforce provisions of Consumer Product Safety Act); Metzger, supra
note 126, at 25-34 (arguing that the Court’s recent preemption decisions are best understood
as reflecting a concern with federal agency failure); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism
Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A
Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 165, 184-91 (2010) (observing “massive regulatory failure” as impetus for passage of the
Act and concluding that involving states in regulation “can help overcome some of [the]
collective action problems” associated with large-scale regulatory efforts).
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federal administrative inaction as well as federal overreaching
represents an important broadening in approaches to administrative federalism.220
The dominance of administrative agencies in setting the scope of
state authority under these initiatives suggests another important
protection for state interests: administrative law. Although constitutional federalism doctrines had an effect on these initiatives, it
was largely an effect at the margin.221 Anticommandeering prohibitions underlie the use of spending and conditional preemption
to obtain state participation in the ACA or Race to the Top.222 In
addition, the Court’s recent preemption jurisprudence gave additional impetus to the Obama Preemption Memo and was an obvious
foil against which the preemption provisions of Dodd-Frank were
drafted. But what these initiatives really showcase is the limited
effectiveness of federalism doctrines in protecting the states from
substantial federal impositions.223 The Court has indicated that it
will give broad deference to comprehensive congressional regulation of economic activity, even if it preempts state legislation, and
has rejected efforts to impose subject matter constraints on federal
220. See Metzger, supra note 126, at 70-75 (discussing justifications for such a state role
and explaining that the value of having use of the states in this fashion originates in the
political branches).
221. See Metzger, supra note 183, at 2048-50 (discussing the Court’s reluctance to curb
congressional regulatory authority on constitutional federalism grounds).
222. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-69, 188 (1992) (distinguishing
commandeering from conditional spending and conditional preemption and prohibiting federal
commandeering of state legislatures); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907, 92430 (2007) (prohibiting federal commandeering of state executive officials); Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (explaining that the effect of
commandeering prohibition is to give states leverage in demanding funds).
223. Courts have split over the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate. See
supra note 27 (collecting decisions). Whatever the ultimate outcome of the individual mandate
litigation, however, it seems unlikely to affect the parts of the ACA with the most direct
impact on the states. So far, only the Northern District of Florida has held the individual
mandate was not severable and therefore invalidated the ACA as a whole, and the Eleventh
Circuit reversed on this point on appeal. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1320 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2011), rev’d in part, Florida v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1326-28 (11th Cir. 2011) (severing the
individual mandate from the remainder of the Act). The Florida district court’s ruling was an
exceptionally broad approach to severability at odds with recent Supreme Court precedent.
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161-62 (2010) (holding that
unconstitutional provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act were severable).
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spending.224 In particular, the Court has routinely upheld clearly
stated funding conditions that violate no independent constitutional
bar, no matter the amount of funds involved or the tangential
relationship a funding condition may bear to the federal program of
which it is part.225 As a result, provisions such as the ACA’s expansion of the Medicaid rolls or creation of state health exchanges
are based on solid constitutional ground, notwithstanding their
substantial impact on the states, and the same is true of DoddFrank and the Recovery Act.226
Race to the Top is an especially stark example of the power of
spending conditions and of the difficulty courts face in policing this
area of federal-state relations. The grant amounts at issue were
substantial but not astronomical, totaling $4.35 billion, compared
to the $75 billion provided to the states for K-12 education by other
provisions of the Recovery Act.227 Yet numerous states dramatically
altered their laws and approach to elementary and secondary
education in the hope of winning a Race to the Top grant.228 Perhaps
this was a reflection of the economic recession and the profound
need states and localities have for any significant additional
education funding. Or perhaps it signals underlying state interest
in many of the educational reforms at issue, with Race to the Top
providing mainly impetus and political cover. Courts are unlikely to
224. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10-33 (2005) (deferring to Congress’s creation of a
comprehensive economic regime and rejecting limits based on state law); South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-12 (1987) (emphasizing that determinations of the general welfare are
for Congress and rejecting claim that Congress can only spend money in the areas identified
by its enumerated Article I powers).
225. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So,
78 IND. L.J. 459, 464-69 (2003) (“[L]ower courts have had little difficulty upholding a wide
range of funding conditions without a clearly explained relationship to the underlying
legislation.”).
226. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp.
2d 1256, 1266-70 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (noting that plaintiffs did not challenge the Medicaid
expansion on the basis of Dole’s four general spending restrictions initially and any such
challenge would fail); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716
F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1154 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing challenge to health exchanges for failure
to state a claim).
227. Total Recovery Act: $787 Billion, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 13, 2011, at 12, available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/01/13/16stimulus.h30.html (providing a detailed
breakdown of Recovery Act education funds).
228. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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be able to determine which of these scenarios occurred, and more
generally to distinguish instances of coercion from “hard political
choices” that states face, including not wanting to raise taxes to
make up for lost federal funds.229
The limited effectiveness of constitutional federalism doctrines
does not mean, of course, that there are no meaningful constraints
on federal power. An important lesson from the Obama administration initiatives concerns the way that political and administrative institutional checks can curb federal overreaching at the
expense of the states. But if judicial constraints are desired, it
seems necessary to look beyond traditional constitutional doctrine
—and in particular to administrative law. I have argued elsewhere
that the Supreme Court is using administrative law as a federalism
surrogate, subjecting administrative decisions affecting state
interests to at times searching scrutiny and enforcing even ordinary
administrative law requirements in ways that benefit the states.230
The Obama administration measures provide a number of opportunities for courts to employ administrative law in this fashion to
advance federalism concerns. Agency decisions that fail to fully
address state concerns or that fail to grant states sufficient discretion as suggested in the governing statutes could be set aside as
unreasoned and exceeding agency authority. Waiver denials or other
determinations with particular impact on the states, such as
decisions to preclude state enforcement or to have the federal
government operate programs in lieu of the states, could be subject
to particularly searching review.231 By thus working through
administrative law, courts may have greater ability to influence how
229. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989); see Defendants’ Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 29-30, McCollum, 716 F. Supp.
2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV/EMT) (noting that Florida, one of the plaintiff states asserting
that the Medicaid expansion was coercive, lacks a state income tax).
230. Metzger, supra note 183, at 2025-29 (arguing administrative law is the new
federalism). Others have made similar arguments. See William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard
Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational
Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521 (2009); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 199, at 1933-41
(critiquing use of administrative law in the name of federalism); Sharkey, supra note 215, at
2180 (commenting upon hard look and Skidmore review of preemption). For a more skeptical
view of administrative federalism, see Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed
Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993 (2010).
231. See Metzger, supra note 183, at 2107 (discussing review of waiver denials).
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federal agencies engage and relate to the states and achieve more
lasting protection of state interests than if they approach federalstate relationships through the limited prism of constitutional
federalism.
CONCLUSION
The early months and years of the Obama administration were
characterized by a burst of legislative and administrative activity,
culminating in the enactment of several major new national
regulatory initiatives. But this expansion of federal regulation also
represented an expansion of state power, as state governments were
granted substantial additional funding and important roles in the
new regulatory regimes. The two key features of these initiatives
are their proregulatory character and the central role of federal
agencies in setting the scope of state authority. As a result, whether
states ultimately end up significantly empowered will depend on
particular states’ interest in playing a greater regulatory role as
well as federal administrative support for substantial state discretion. What seems clear so far, however, is that federalism under
Obama is federalism in service to progressive policy.

